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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, 1 9 58-1966 :
A SEARCH FOR POLICY THROUGH
SCALOGRAM ANALYSIS
S. R. PECK*
Toronto

Introduction

It is safe to predict in Centennial Year that before the Supreme
Court of Canada celebrates its one hundredth birthday on April
8th, 1975,= its work will be made the object of behavioural studies
which will add a new dimension to the lawyer's understanding of
the court's role in the nation's political life. Behavioural investigations of the judicial process in the United States of America, inspired by the work of those judges, law teachers and lawyers
known as Legal Realists but carried out by political scientists
rather than lawyers, have been published in large numbers in the
past fifteen years.' Focusing largely on the work of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and emphasizing aspects of that work
not traditionally considered by lawyers, these studies mark judicial
behaviouralism as one of the most provocative developments in
American jurisprudence since the second world war . In Canada,
interest in hehavioural approaches is growing among political
scientists and law teachers,' and a number of behavioural and
statistical studies of the Supreme Court of Canada will soon be
published .`
*S . R. Peck, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
'The Supreme Court Act, 38 Vict., c. 11, received the Royal Assent on
April 8th, 1875, and the six original members of the court were appointed
on October 8th, 1875 .
' For references, see G. A. Schubert, Bibliographical Essay: Behavioral
Research in Public Law (1963), 57 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 433, S. R. Peck, A
Behavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram Analysis (1967),
5 Osgoode Hall L. J. 1, at pp. 2-4.
'P. Meyer, Jurimetrics : The Scientific Method in Legal Research
(1966) . 44 Can. Bar Rev. 1 .
`S . R. Mitchell, The Supreme Court of Canada Since the Abolition of
Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, A Quantitative
Analysis (June, 1967), paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa (mimeograph), an enlarged
version is to be published. Professor Peter H. Russell has applied statistical
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The judicial behaviouralists in the United States have developed several different approaches to the study of the judicial
process; however, they share certain characteristics which identify
them as a school of thought. They all look upon the administration
of public law by courts as an aspect of political behaviour, in continuous interaction with other political institutions and forces ; and,
accordingly, they regard judges as policy makers . They bring to
the study of courts, the theories and techniques of the social
sciences, particularly political theory, economics and social psychology, and focus upon the behaviour of individual judges and
other participants in the judicial process. They use statistical
methods of data processing, and so are able to consider larger
samples of the relevant data than was possible for earlier students
of the judicial process.
Judicial behaviouralism, as might be expected, has not come
upon the jurisprudential scene as a fully developed and perfected
discipline . The validity of the theories on which behavioural studies
of the Supreme Court of the United States are based, and of the
methods used in those studies, has been challenged, and is the
subject matter of an ongoing debate .' A behavioural analysis of the
work of the Supreme Court of Canada must bear the burden not
only of the theoretical and methodological problems already identified in the United States, but also of new and different problems
arising from the application of behavioural techniques to a court
with distinctive characteristics. Accordingly, the present attempt
to apply a behavioural method of analysis to the Supreme Court
of Canada, is as much a test of the method, as it is an investigation
of the work of the court. It is offered as a report of an initial effort
in a new direction, and not as a statement of a final position.
In the present article, I investigate the work of the Supreme
Court of Canada in three areas-taxation, negligence and criminal
law-through the use of scalogram analysis . I first discuss the
method, and then apply it to the three areas mentioned.
methods of analysis to certain aspects of the work of the Supreme Court of
Canada in a study done for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism. This study will be published in the near future . I understand
that Professor J. L. Baudouin has done work using statistical methods for
the Government of the Province of Quebec.
'W. Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral Approach to 'the Judicial Process:
A Critique (1963), 57 Am . Pol. Sci. Rev. 59 3 ; T. L. Becker, Political
Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence (1964) ; J. Tanenhaus, The
Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions (1966), 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1583 ;
FI. J. Spaeth, Unidimensionality and Item Invariance in Judicial Scaling
(1965), 10 Behavioral Science 290; G. Schubert, Ideologies and Attitudes,
Academic and Judicial (1967), 29 J. of Pol. 3.
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I. Guttman Cumulative Scalograms.
The Guttman cumulative scale' is a technique developed by social
psychologists to measure the attitudes of subjects toward social
objects, and to locate the subjects on an attitudinal dimension or
continuum . An attitude has been defined as an enduring syndrome
of response consistency with regard to a set of social objects.
Like many psychological variables, attitude is a hypothetical or latent
variable, rather than an immediate observable variable . The concept
of attitude does not refer to any one specific act or response of an individual, but is an abstraction from a large number of related acts or
responses. For example, when we state that individual A has a less
favourable attitude toward labour organizations than individual B, we
mean that A's many different statements and actions concerning labour
organizations are consistently less favourable to labour than are B's
comparable words and deeds. We are justified in using a comprehensive
concept like attitude when the many related responses are consistent .
That is, i¬ people who disapprove of the closed shop are also likely to
want to outlaw strikes, and to oppose minimum wage laws, then it
seems reasonable to speak of an anti-labour attitude .'

Social psychologists have attempted to measure attitudes by
eliciting the verbal responses of subjects to questions or statements
which relate to a given social object . For example, to measure
attitudes toward foreigners, subjects might be asked to respond to
the following series of statements :
I am willing to accept foreigners
1 . as visitors to my country ;
2. as citizens of my country ;
3 . as members of my trade ;
4. as neighbours ;
5. as personal friends ;
6. as relatives by marriage .
Individual subjects may indicate that they are willing to admit
foreigners to a certain degree of social relationship, but that they
will exclude them from any closer relationship . If we assign to each
subject, as his score, the number of the last statement to which he
assents, indicating the closest relationship to which he is willing to
admit foreigners, we are able to compare with one another the
See references cited in Peck, loc. cit., footnote 2, at pp. 4-11 .
' Green, B. F., Attitude Measurement in Lindzey, G. (ed.), Handbook
of Social Psychology (1954), Vol. 1 . For a general discussion of attitudes
in, the theory of social psychology see Newcomb, T. M., Social Psychology :
The Study of Human Interaction (1965), pp . 1-153 .
R
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attitude of each subject. A subject, with a score of 6 has a more
favourable attitude toward foreigners than one whose score is 2.
In this way we are able to measure the attitudes of individuals and
to locate each on an attitudinal continuum or dimension.
The statements are cumulative in the sense that each one
represents a more favourable attitude than the one which precedes
it. Accordingly, it is expected that each subject who responds
affirmatively to any statement will respond affirmatively to all
statements which precede it, and each subject who responds negatively to any statement will respond negatively to all statements
which follow it. Responses which meet these conditions are said to
be consistent ; those which do not are said to be inconsistent .
A subject might respond affirmatively to statements 1, 2, 3, 5
and 6, but negatively to statement 4. That the response to number
4 is inconsistent, may indicate that it is based on an attitude other
than the one under investigation ; for example, it may be based on
the subject's attitude toward expected changes in property values.
This indicates that statement 4 relates to the latter attitudinal
dimension, rather than to the one under investigation.
We may use the series of statements as a measure of subjects'
attitudes toward foreigners only if the statements relate to that
attitudinal dimension and to no other, so that the responses are
based on or determined by that attitude; that is, only if the statements are unidimensional. When no inconsistencies occur in the
responses, it is likely that all the statements relate to the attitude
being investigated, and that the responses are made on the basis
of that attitude . However, when inconsistencies occur, it is necessary to devise a test to determine whether all or most of the statements relate to the attitudinal dimension under investigation.
Louis L. Guttman devised a scale which, he suggested, establishes the unidimensionality of the statements contained on it.
In constructing a Guttman cumulative scale, a researcher chooses
questions or statements which he believes to be samples of the
whole range of questions which relate to the attitudinal dimension
under investigation, and which' he believes to be distributed over
the entire range off that dimension. The Guttman cumulative scale
is a tabulation of the . subjects' responses to those statements or
questions .
We may construct a Guttman scale if we assume that five
subjects A, fit, C, D and IE respond to the six statements about
foreigners as indicated below. .(An affirmative response is designated by a plus sign, and a negative response by a minus sign .)
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It is apparent that A's attitude toward foreig ers is relatively
favourable, and E's unfavourable . The attitudes of C and D fall
between the two extremes represented by A and E. The only inconsistent response is that of B to statement 4.
Where the statements on the scale are such that all subjects
do, in fact respond consistently, the statements are said to be
"scalable" . Scalability is taken as evidence that the statements are
unidimensional, that is, that the statements relate to a single attitudinal dimension, and that the responses to them are determined
by that attitude (in the above example, the attitude to foreigners) .
Thus, it is said that scalability evidences unidimensionality .
However, in practice, a perfectly consistent scale occurs only
rarely. Guttman took the position that as long as the number of
consistent responses constitutes more than ninety per cent of the
total number of responses, it is likely that the responses are largely
determined by a single dominant attitude, although secondary attitudinal dimensions may be responsible for the inconsistencies.
Thus, Guttman was willing to accept as scalable, statements on a
scale on which at least ninety per cent of the responses are consistent. In a later development, it was proposed that a scale with
an observed consistency of ninety per cent or more should be considered scalable only if the observed consistency is significantly
greater than the minimum consistency possible given the structure
of the scale'
To measure the degree of consistency, Guttman developed a
formula for a "coefficient of reproducibility" (R), which indicates
in decimal form the percentage of consistency.' A formula for the
"minimum marginal reproducibility" (MMR) indicates the mini-

'The minimum consistency possible on any scale is "an empirical function of the extremity and distribution of the marginal frequencies" . See
G. A. Schubert, The Judicial Mind, 1965, North-Western U.P ., at p. 79 .
' R is calculated by the formula
R = I - number of inconsistent responses
number of responses
Responses to any question on the scale are not included in the calculation of R, if eighty per cent or more of those responses are either affirmative or negative . If responses to questions which elicit a nearly unanimous
response were counted, the degree of consistency would be spuriously high
because the closer the responses approach unanimity, the less possibility
there is that some responses will be inconsistent.
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mum consistency possible given the structure of the scale." Herbert
Menzel' developed a "coefficient of scalability" (S) which provides
another standard of scalability. If R is .90 or greater, the difference
between R and MMlg is between .15 and .20, and S is .60 or
eater, the array of statements is scalable, and the researcher
concludes, on the basis of Guttman theory, that the statements are
unidimensional, and that the responses are determined by a single
dominant attitude . Such an array of statements measures a single
attitudinal dimension, and so may be used to measure the intensity
of the attitude in subjects, and to locate the subjects along the
attitudinal dimension.
Certain judicial behaviouralists'2 in the United States have
adapted the theory and method of cumulative scaling for use in
the analysis of judicial decisions. In their studies, which concentrate
largely on the public law decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, they assume that judicial decisions are determined
by the judges' attitudes toward policy issues and not by their views
of the governing statutes, precedents and legal rules. For example,
the researcher formulates the hypothesis that judges decide civil
liberties cases on the basis of their attitudes toward the deprivation
of a civil liberty, rather than on the basis of the legal considerations
relevant to each case. Each non-unanimous case raising a civil
liberty issue is treated as posing a question in the form, "Shall )<
allow a deprivation of the claimed civil liberty to the extent represented by this case?" The judges' votes, and not their reasons for
judgment, are taken to be their responses to the question posed
by each case.
The vote of each judge is classified as affirmative or negative
in terms of the attitude which is the subject matter of the hypothesis ; for example, a vote will be classified as affirmative if it
upholds the civil liberty claim, and as negative if it rejects the
claim . The non-unanimous cases are arranged vertically in order
of the number of affirmative votes cast in each case; and the
judges are arranged horizontally in accordance àdith the position
on the scale of the last consistent affirmative vote cast by each
judge.
The measures applicable to Guttman cumulative scales are
accepted to determine whether a scale evidences the dominance of
a single attitude.' Therefore, if on the scale of civil liberty cases,
'° Cr. A. Schubert, loc. cit., footnote 8.
'A New Coefficient for Scalogram Analysis (1953), 17 Public Opinion
Quarterly 268.
11 See Peck, loc. cit., footnote 2.
'3
Put, see, infra, text at footnote 16.
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the coefficient of reproducibility is .90 or more and is significantly
higher than the minimum marginal reproducibility, and the coefficient of scalability is .60 or more, the judicial behaviouralist
concludes in accordance with Guttman theory that civil liberty
cases are scalable, that they are unidimensional, (that is, that they
all relate to the same attitudinal dimension), and, accordingly,
chat all the judges reach their decisions in civil liberty cases on the
basis of a single dominant attitude-their attitude toward civil
liberties . Thus, the researcher concludes that the hypothesis is
verified .
The behaviouralists take the scale to indicate the attitude of
each judge in relation to that of every other judge. The judge at
the extreme left is the one who casts the greatest number of
affirmative votes; the judicial behaviouralists claim that he exhibits
the most favourable attitude to the issue raised by the cases . The
remainder of the judges are ranked from left to right on the scale
in accordance with the number of affirmative votes cast by each;
the behaviouralists argue that the order in which the judges are
ranked indicates the extent to which the attitude of each favours
civil liberty claims . Thus, if an affirmative vote is defined as a
"liberal" vote, the scale is taken to indicate which judges are
"liberal", which are "conservative" and which are "moderate".
The description of any judge as "liberal", "conservative", or
"moderate" is, of course, relative to the composition of the court,
and to the extremity of the civil liberty claims raised in the cases
before the court.
The scale directs the researcher's attention to cases containing
inconsistent votes. If a vote is inconsistent because it is based on
an attitude other than the one measured by the scale, the second
attitude may perhaps be identified through the use of subscales .
A second attitude may influence the judges' votes in a case which
involves more than one issue ; for example, if a case on the civil
liberties scale raises an issue of states' rights, the judges' votes in
that case may be influenced by their attitudes toward states' rights
as well as by their attitudes toward civil liberties . It is possible to
construct a subscale which contains only those cases on the main
scale which raise both issues. The behaviouralists claim that the
subscale enables them to investigate the extent to which the decisions in those cases are affected by the attitude to each issue."
Although the judicial behaviouralists in the United States accept the proposition that the scalability of related judicial decisions
"See Peck, loc . cit ., footnote 2, at pp . 16 to 19 .
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evidences unidimensionality," they have long recognized, as have
concerned statisticians and mathematicians, that a uniform criterion
for testing scalability is lacking." In view of the convincing body
of opinion and evidence to suggest that for scales of judicial decisions, scalability does not evidence unidimensionality, I concluded in an earlier study" that lawyers should not accept the
view that the production of an acceptable scale establishes that
judges reach their decisions on the basis of their attitudes .
Nevertheless, scalogram analysis contributes to our understanding of the judicial process, as the scalogram is an informative
descriptive device . The scalogram focuses on voting behaviour in
large numbers of related non-unanimous decisions, highlighting the
voting patterns of individual judges and of the court as a whole. It
permits the construction of a composite picture . of the judges'
voting behaviour over a period of years as the membership of the
court changes. Subscales may enable the researcher to isolate
groups of cases which contain a common secondary issue, and to
focus upon voting patterns in those cases. Thus, scalogram analysis
may enable the researcher to discover that certain relationships
exist between judges' votes and the policy issue raised by the cases;
for example, that the effect of most of the votes of some judges is
consistently to uphold (or, to oppose) certain claims, and that the
effect of the votes of other judges is sometimes to uphold and sometimes to oppose such claims .
An instrument which describes the effect of judicial votes on
policy issues is valuable although it does not in itself explain why
the judges vote as they do, because it may assist the researcher to
arrive at such an explanation. Having discovered a relationship
between the judges' votes and the value raised by the cases, the
researcher will be able to examine its significance. He will pay
particular attention to judges who consistently decide cases in
favour of a certain value, that is, who consistently uphold or oppose a certain type of claim and consequently appear near the
extreme left or right side of the scale, for there is a greater likelihood that such judges decide cases on the basis of their attitudes
toward values .' By analysing the issues, the reasons for judgment,
"Ibid., at pp. 11-19 .
" See Schubert, loc. cit., footnote 5, at pp. 16, 23-25, and earlier
references cited therein; Tanenhaus, loc. cit., footnote 5, at p. 1593 .
"For a discussion of some of the relevant considerations, see Peck,
loc cit., footnote 2, at pp . 19-22 .
" W. Mendelson, loc. cit., footnote 5, at p. 598. Put, see Schubert's discussion of the justices in the middle ranks of a scale, loc. cit., footnote 5, at
pp. 34-37. The view that only the respondents at the extremes of the scale
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the unanimous cases not on the scale, and the voting behaviour in
the scaled cases, he may conclude that some judges do reach their
decisions on the basis of their attitudes to the values involved .
To assess the significance of the voting patterns described by
a scalogram, it is necessary to bear in mind the characteristics of
a scalogram and the limitations which derive from those characteristics .
First, the scale contains only those decisions in which the court
divides. It does not include appeals in which a single "judgment of
the court" is given, or appeals in which two or more judges give
separate reasons for judgment but all participating judges vote in
the same way ." As divided decisions form a small minority of all
decisions reported in any year,"' the scalogram omits most of the
decisions of the court . On the other hand, those cases which give
rise to disagreement on the court clearly warrant special attention .
Secondly, the choice of cases to be included on a scale is,
within certain broad limits, a matter for the discretion of the researcher. The voting patterns shown by the scalogram will, of
course, depend on the choice made. In constructing the scalograms
presented in this article, the author considered all cases identified
by the editors of the Supreme Court Reports with catch-words
relevant to taxation, negligence, or criminal law, and referred in a
footnote to all such cases not included on the scale.
Thirdly, the preparation of a scale requires that the researcher
abstract from a series of cases (many of which may raise more
than one issue) a single issue, for example, a claim by an accused
in a criminal appeal for his liberty, and to classify each justice's
vote in each case in terms of that issue, that is, as upholding or
rejecting the claim . An individual justice may base his vote on a

respond on the basis of their attitudes is inconsistent with Guttman theory.
However, the position I take in the text is consistent with the view that the
scalability of judicial decisions does not evidence unidimensionality (supra,
footnote 17), and that scales of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
are not cumulative (infra, text at footnote 34).
"Such appeals may be included on a scale if it is found that although
all judges vote in the same way, some judges.appear in their reasons for
judgment to be more affirmative or negative (in terms of the scale classification) than others . No attempt was made to include such appeals on the
scales presented in this article.
`The 1966 volume of the Supreme Court Reports contains fifty judgments of the court, twenty-four divided decisions, and six unanimous
decisions containing more than one set of reasons for judgment . The corresponding figures for the other volumes considered in this article are:
1965-40, 34, 6; 1964-55, 18, 6; 1963-62, 17, 4; 1962-62, 19, 12 ;
1961-43, 14, 21 ; 1960-43, 22, 14 ; 1959-48, 17, 14 ; 1958 (appeals heard
on or after January 15th, 1958)-13, 15, 14. Each of the volumes for
1958, 1961, 1962, 1964 and 1965 contains one judgment of a single judge
in chambers .
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different issue in the case-the adequacy of the charge, a technical
rule of law, the construction of a statute, or the question whether
the court has jurisdiction . Indeed, in cases on the criminal law scale,
infra, the issues discussed by the justices are generally of this sort,
and rarely, if ever, a simple question of guilt or innocence. A
judge whose vote is classified as negative may not intend to vote
against the claim of an accused, except in the sense that he knows
that his vote on the other issue has the effect of rejecting that
claim. ®n the other hand, the classification describes the effect of
the vote as rejecting the claim, and the scale shows the effect of
all justices' votes on all such claims in divided decisions.
Fourthly, within broad limits, the analyst has some choice in
ordering the cases on the scale. The voting pattern described for
each judge by the scale will depend upon how that choice is
exercised. Thus, scales may be said to be indeterminate in the sense
that different analysts, using the same cases, may produce different
scales, that is to say, different descriptions of the justices' voting
behaviour.
Cases are ordered in accordance with the proportion of affirmative votes they contain, on the assumption that a case with proportionately more affirmative votes raises a less extreme claim than
a case with proportionately fewer affirmative votesless extreme
because a relatively larger number of justices supported it ." This
method of ordering is followed in an attempt to place each case
on the scale above every other case containing a less extreme
claim. Such a placement of cases is necessary to produce a cumulative scale.'
The development of rules" governing the ordering of cases
on a scale has reduced, but not eliminated the element of indeter' This is one consideration negating the view that a scale indicates directly
the justices' attitudes to claims by accused persons. For a further discussion
of the implications of focusing on votes rather than opinions, see Peck,
loc. cit., footnote 2, at p. 23, and references cited therein.
'a
But see J. Tanenhaus, loc. cit., footnote 5, at p. 1590. Tanenhaus
suggests that the assumption is not justified. This criterion, of course, assumes that justices vote in accordance with their attitudes to the claim, an
assumption , which is made in Guttman theory, and by the judicial behaviouralists in the United States . I argue, supra, footnote 17, that the view
that justices vote according to their attitudes is not justified as an assumption, or as a conclusion based solely on the ground that cases ,produce an
acceptable scale, although it may be justified as a conclusion about some
judges in some cases, where all the circumstances warrant such a conclusion.
sa
See discussion of Guttman cumulative scales, supra.
2'
G. A. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (1959),
Glencoe Free Press, pp. 282-283 ; and loc. cit., footnote 5, at pp. , 21-22 .
I3. J. Spaeth, loc. cit., footnote 5, at pp . 299-301 .
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minacy which results from the discretion exercised by the analyst.
The scales presented in this article were constructed in accordance
with the following method (with certain exceptions discussed,
infra.) . All cases were placed in groups according to the voting
division of the justices, for example, all cases with four affirmative
votes and one negative vote were placed in one group. The cases
in each voting division group were placed on the scale in accordance with the ratio of affirmative to negative votes in each
group, each group being placed above any other group containing
a lower ratio of affirmative to negative votes . Cases within each
group were arranged first to eliminate inconsistent votes, and thereafter in accordance with the date of judgment .
If this method is followed without exception, the degree of
indeterminacy which results from the exercise of discretion by the
analyst, is reduced to a single situation : that is, a case containing
an inconsistent vote which the analyst may assign to either one
of two justices' depending on the position in which he places the
case. As a meaningful assignment of the inconsistent vote depends
on the particular characteristics of the individual case and justices
concerned,' it is undesirable to lay down a mechanical rule to
govern the positioning of such a case; therefore, the choice must
be left with the analyst .
Spaeth proposes that cases be ordered on the basis of the "expected"
voting division in each case, i.e ., the vote that would have resulted if all
justices participated in each case and voted consistently. I did not attempt
to apply this method in constructing the scales here, as it requires the imputation of votes to non-participating justices . In view of the large number
of non-participations on scales of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada, the imputed votes would outnumber the actual votes.
Schubert, loc. cit., footnote 5, at p. 21, argues that the development of
computer programmes makes obsolete the procedures of scale construction
discussed here . Spaeth, in conversation with the author, expressed the view
that, as the computer programmes developed to date were devised to prepare scales containing large numbers of respondents, they are not suitable
for the construction of scales of judicial decisions.
See, for example, the votes of Cartwright and Ritchie JJ . in case no .
66-384 of the Taxation scale infra. The inconsistent vote was assigned to
Cartwright J. by placing case no . 66-384 below case no . 64-177 . If case no .
66-384 were placed below case no. 59-548, the inconsistent vote would
result to Ritchie J. Similarly, if case no. 66-479 on the same scale were
placed below 64-177, the inconsistent vote would result to Ritchie J: .rather
than Spence J.
=' Spaeth suggests six circumstances to be considered in the assignment
of inconsistencies when an option exists : the possibility that a justice perceives the issue in a case as raising a value other than the value' in terms
of which the scale is constructed; the existence of a previous pattern of
inconsistent responses in cases containing a consistent sub-element ; the
possibility that the case presents a new and complex question for decision ;
the previous rank of the justices on the issue; whether one of the two
justices often responds inconsistently, and the length of service on the
court of each justice; loc. cit., footnote 5, at pp. 301-303.
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Accordingly, a degree of indeterminacy (resulting from the
analyst's exercise of discretion) in the ordering of cases and hence
in the description of the justices' voting patterns cannot be elimi
nated. The scope of the indeterminacy will vary directly, not only
with the number of such cases on a scale, but also with the number
of cases and non-participations in the voting division group .-' As
scales of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have many
non-participations, (resulting from the court's practice of sitting
in panels) such scales and the voting patterns they describe are
less determinate (that is, more dependent on the analyst's discretion), than are scales of decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
Furthermore, the degree of indeterminacy is increased if the
analyst departs from the rule requiring the chronological ordering
of cases in each voting division group (after the number of in
consistent votes in the group is reduced to a minimum) . Nevertheless, there is reason to suggest that this rule should not be followed
invariably . Although the rule decreases the subjective discretionary
element in scalogram analysis, it introduces a mechanical element
in case ordering which may, on occasion, distort the voting pattern described by the scale. Selectivity in the application of the
rule is particularly important in the construction of scales of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, as adherence to the rule
is more likely to distort voting patterns on a scale containing many
non-participations' I suggest, therefore, that the rule should not
be followed in circumstances which indicate that a departure from
it will produce a scale which presents,a more accurate description
of the justices' voting behaviour.
If it is objected that departure from the rule opens the door
'The number of possible positions for any case increases with the size
of the voting division group. Where there are many non-participations
(blanks in the scale), it is less likely that movement of any case will result
in the creation of additional inconsistent votes therefore, greater movement
is possible.
See the scales presented infra .
For example, adherence to the rule will artificially lower a justice's
break-point if the justice did not participate in any of. the early cases
within the voting division group in which his break-point occurs . The last
consistent affirmative vote which determines the position of the break-point
will be separated from the second last consistent affirmative vote by the
early cases in which he did not participate. On the T scale, infra, compliance
with the rule would require that cases nos. 58-577, 59-548 and 59-850 be
placed in that order following case no. 60-735 . If the cases were positioned
in that way, Ritchie and Spence JJ . would have lower break-points and
higher scale scores than they have on the present scales, a result which,
considering their voting divisions, would describe their voting patterns less
accurately than does the present T scale.
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to the production of different scales of the same cases, one can
reply only that that result flows from the limitations of scalogram
analysis, especially, perhaps, when applied to decisions of a court
which sits in panels . The possibility of producing competing scales
which differ from each other, the validity of which must be assessed on the basis of the reasons put forward by the researchers,
seems to be preferable to the construction of a single scale, put
forward as the only possible scale, with a claim to validity which
is based upon a rule, which, while not without certain advantages,
cannot be theoretically justified.
The remaining matter to consider in assessing the meaning of a
scalogram is the classification of the voting patterns of individual
justices . The justices appear on the scale from left to right in ac
cordance with the location of the break-point of each justice, that
is, the point at which a justice ceases to vote consistently affirmative and begins to vote consistently negative ." The lower a justice's
break-point on the scale, the closer to the left of the scale he will
be .
Each justice's voting pattern may be classified according to
his scale score, a numerical value reflecting the position of the
justice's break-point. The scale score may range from -1-1 .00
(where the break-point occurs in the last case on the scale),
through 0 (where it occurs in the middle case) to -1.00 (where
it occurs in the first case) . On the basis of his scale score, the
effect of a justice's voting pattern may be classified as strongly in
favour of the affirmative value (1 .00 to .60), in favour of the
affirmative value ( .59 to .20), neutral (.19 to - .19), in favour
of the negative value (-.20 to -.59) or strongly in favour of the
negative value (-.60 to -1 .00) .
There are reasons to suggest that for a scale of decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada, the justices' scale scores, based on
their break-points, should not be taken as the sole measure of
their individual voting patterns. Voting patterns may be measured
3°

where non-participations occur between a justice's last consistent
affirmative vote and his first consistent negative vote, the break-point line
is drawn midway between the two votes. In the case of a justice for whom
that is necessary, the scalogram locates a break zone rather than a breakpoint, and the voting pattern described is less precise. A similar problem
arises for judges who cast no affirmative votes and have non-participations
prior to their first negative vote .
' Scale score is calculated by the formula
-1
2 X scale position
scale score - number of cases on the scale
(where scale position equals the position of a justice's last affirmative
consistent vote.)
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on the basis of break-points only on scales containing items which
are arranged cumulatively, that is, only on true Guttman cumulative scales. If the items are not arranged cumulatively, it cannot
be said that a subject with a low break-point has responded
affirmatively to more extreme claims than a subject with a high
break-point . Accordingly, if the items are not arranged cumulatively, the scale scores do not afford a meaningful measure of the
voting patterns.
It is plausible to argue'" that cases ordered in accordance with
the proportion of affirmative votes which they contain, are cumulative, where (as in the United States Supreme Court) all cases are
decided by the full court.'" However, where, as in the Supreme
Court of Canada, the cases are decided by different panels of
judges, the number of affirmative votes cast in any case may be a
function, not of the extremity_ of the claim in that case, but of the
attitudes of the particular justices who hear it. Accordingly, there
is no reason to believe that when the cases are ordered on the basis
of voting division, they have been arranged cumulatively. My argument here is, in effect, that scales of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada may not be Guttman scales because the cases of
which they are composed may not be ordered in accordance with
the extremity of the claims raised'
If that is true, it follows that on scales of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada, scale scores should not be accepted
as the sole measure of the effect of a justice's voting pattern .
Accordingly, I propose that a justice's voting division be used as a
second measure of the effect of his voting pattern . ®n the basis of
the voting division, a justice's voting pattern may be classified as
strongly in favour of the affirmative value (if the justice votes
affirmatively in eighty per cent to one hundred per cent of the
cases in which he participates) in favour of the affirmative value
(sixty per cent to seventy-nine per cent), neutral (forty-one per
cent to fifty-nine per cent), in favour of the negative value (twentyone per cent to forty per cent), or strongly in favour of the negative value (zero per cent to twenty per cent) .
'` This argument assumes that the justices base their decisions on their
attitudes to the value raised by the cases . See supra, footnote 22.
"' But see Tanenhaus, loc . cit., footnote 5, at pp. 1590-1591 .
Of course, it is possible that cases on such scales will, in fact, be
ordered cumulatively . Evidence of such an ordering will exist where participation of all the justices (or at least of justices with all voting patterns
represented on the scale) are distributed along the scale. If the scalograms
do not approximate Guttman cumulative scales, then, of course, there
is no basis whatever for the claim that scalability establishes unidimensionality.
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I propose that the scale score and voting division be used as
complementary measures . To avoid overstatement, I propose that,
where the two measures characterize a voting pattern in different
ways, the voting pattern should be classified according to the
measure which results in the less extreme characterization, unless
special circumstances warrant classification according to the measure which gives the more extreme result"
The classification of the voting pattern of any judge on the
basis of these measures is relative to the composition of the court
and to the nature of the appeals which came before the court.
Thus, the description of any justice's voting division as, for example, "in favour of the affirmative value" is meaningful only as a
means of comparing that justice's voting behaviour with the voting
behaviour of other justices on the scale, and only as a description
of his voting behaviour in appeals raising claims of the sort which
were raised in the appeals on the scale. Further, the numerical
limits of each classification are chosen arbitrarily as a matter of
definition to make classification possible . Although it is necessary
to decide where the lines shall be drawn and to adhere to that
decision when classifying voting patterns, the voting patterns in
different classifications may not be fundamentally different ; the
categories are not sharply divided but merge with each other. One
cannot, of course attribute great weight to small numerical differences, especially where the quantity of data (that is, the number of cases), is small. Finally, although numerical values involving decimal fractions and percentages have been used to
The two measures indicate the same classification of all voting patterns, if all justices participate and vote consistently in all cases . Under
those conditions, any justice who has a lower break-point than any other
justice (and therefore a more affirmative scale score), will necessarily have
a larger proportion of affirmative votes .
On true Guttman cumulative scalograms, as all subjects normally
respond to all questions and as ninety per cent of all votes must be consistent, the two measures will give the same results. Similarly, the two
measures will normally give the same results on scales of decisions of the
United States Supreme Court which, too, contain comparatively few nonparticipations . See G. A. Schubert, loc. cit., footnote 8, at pp. 104-112.
Scales of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada contain a relatively
large number of non-participations (see infra) . Thus, a justice may have
a lower break-point and a more affirmative scale score than another justice
although he casts a larger proportion of negative votes. (Compare Ritchie
7. and Fauteux J. on the Negligence scale.)
'For example, classification on the basis of voting division may give a
less extreme result than classification on the basis of scale score, solely
because the. voting division is moderated by inconsistent votes which may
be explained as votes clearly based on a secondary issue. In such a case,
classification on the basis of the more extreme result appears to be justified
Cf. Mr. Justice Judson's voting pattern on the N. scale infra.
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classify voting patterns, it is not claimed that the resulting classifications have mathematical precision .
In summary, 1 have argued that a scalogram should be taken,
prima facie, only as describing the effect of justices' votes on a
particular type of claim or value raised by a group of cases . Re
garded alone, the scalogram does not indicate directly the justices'
attitudes to the value; nor does it establish that the justices decide
cases on the basis of their attitudes, although it may suggest the
possibility that they do. Such a possibility must be assessed in the
light of the reasons for judgment in the scaled cases, the unanimous
decisions which do not appear on the scale, and the whole range of
legal and sociological insights which are revealed by a traditional
and realist analysis of the cases. When we assess the significance of
the voting patterns identified by scalograms, we must bear in mind
the limitations which flow from the indeterminate elements in
scales, that is, the subjective discretionary choices which enter into
the selection of cases, the ordering of cases and, consequently, the
ranking of the justices . In making that assessment, Canadian
lawyers must note particularly that the large number of non-participations on scales of Canadian decisions detracts to a degree from
the descriptive value of the scales, and increases the scope of indeterminacy in scale construction . Finally, the reader must bear
in mind that the scales contained in this article are not put forward as the only possible scalograms of the relevant cases . Further
evaluation of the cases and of the limitations of scalogramn analysis
when applied to the Supreme Court of Canada, may suggest that
other scalograms, differently constructed, will present a more accurate picture of the work of the court.
®n the other hand, the scalograms in this article are put forward with confidence that they present a meaningful picture of
the effect of the justices' votes in a significant group of cases in
the three areas investigated, and that they throw light on the
nature of judicial decision-making by the members of the court .
The voting pattern described for each justice on the scale indicates
the effect of that justice's votes in a group of appeals in which the
court was called upon to pass judgment on a certain type of claim
or value, and in which the members of the court were not in agreement. In terms of legal analysis, the results in the appeals contained on each scale turned on the justices' views of a large number of diverse legal issues involving the construction and application of statutes, the ascertainment (or creation) and application
of rules of law and the assessment of inferences drawn from the
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facts by different trial judges . Under these circumstances, when a
scale indicates that certain justices uphold or deny a given claim
in a large majority of cases in which they participate, we must
face the question whether their decisions are based on particular
statutes and legal rules, or on their attitudes towards that claim.
II. Scalogram Analysis of the Work of the Supreme Court of
Canada.

I wish now to present and discuss scalograms of recent taxation,
negligence and criminal law decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada . Each scalogram contains relevant appeals heard by the
court after January 15th, 1958 and reported in the 1958 to 1966
volumes of the Supreme Court Reports. A period starting on
January 15th, 1958, was selected as only three justices (Kerwin
C.J., and Rand and Locke JJ.) on the court on that date left the
court up to the time of writing' The period chosen is long enough
to contain a moderately large number of appeals of each type, and
short enough to limit the number of judges represented on the
scales to twelve. A scale covering a longer period will contain decisions of a larger number of justices and, therefore, a larger
number of non-participations ' The scalograms produced below
cover the entire terms of office of Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Hall
and Spence JJ., two-thirds of Mr. Justice Abbott's term of office,
one-half of Mr. Justice Cartwright's and Mr. Justice Fauteux's
terms of office and not quite one-third of Chief Justice Taschereau's term of office .' Accordingly, conclusions drawn about
the voting behaviour of Tâschereau C.J . and Cartwright, Fauteux
and Abbott JJ. must remain tentative until all relevant decisions
of these justices during their entire terms of office have been
studied .
On the scalograms, each justice is designated by the first letter
of his surname, with the exception of Rand J., for whom the letters
'°Kerwin C.J . died on February 2nd, 1963 . Rand J. retired on April
27th, 1959, and Locke J. on September 18th, 1962 .
'For example, a scalogram for the period beginning December 22nd,
1949, the date of appointment of Cartwright and Fauteux JJ., will cover
the entire terms of all justices currently on the court other than Taschereau
C.J ., but will also include decisions of Rinfret C.J ., and Estey, Kellock
and Nolan JJ ., in addition to those of Kerwin C.J . and Rand and Locke
JJ .
The justices on the court on July. 1st, 1967 and their dates of appointment are as follows : Taschereau C. J. (February 9th, 1940) ; Cartwright
and Fauteux JJ . (December 22nd, 1949) ; Abbott J. (July 1st, 1954) ; Martland J. (January 15th, 1958); Judson J. (February 5th, 1958) ; Ritchie J.
(May 5th, 1959) ; Hall J. (November 23rd, 1962), and Spence J. (June
11th, 1963).
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Ra are used, to avoid confusion with Ritchie J. Each case is
designated by the year and page number of its location in the
Supreme Court Reports. Thus, the designation 58-441 indicates
the appeal reported in [1958) S.C .Y . 441 .
) The Taxation Scale

The Taxation Scale (T)" contains twenty-eight divided decisions in taxation appeals heard by the Supreme Court of Canada
after January 15th, 1958, and reported in the 1955 to 1966
volumes of the Supreme Court Reports. The T scale includes
fourteen cases arising under the federal Income Tax Act," six cases
arising under the federal Excise Tax Act," three cases concerning
federal death duties," one case arising under the federal Customs
"'I have omitted from the T scale Guay v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R . 12.
The majority (Taschereau C.J ., and Cartwright, Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Spence JJ .) held that notwithstanding s. 2(e) of
the. Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C ., 1960, c. 44, and the requirements of
procedural natural justice, a taxpayer was not entitled as of right to be
present at an inquiry into his affairs conducted under s. 126(4) and (8) of
the Income Tax Act, R.S .C ., 1952, c. 148. Hall J. dissented. The reasons
for judgment indicate that the justices viewed the appeal as turning on the
question whether the inquiry was a judicial or -administrative inquiry, and
not on the fact that it was held pursuant to the Income To Act.
'z R.S.C., 1952, c . 148. North Ray Mica Co . Ltd. v. M.N.R ., [1958]
S.C .R . 597; Evans v. M.N.R ., [1960] S.C .R . 391 ; Irrigation Industries Ltd.
v. M.N .R ., [1962] S.C .R. 346; Montreal Trust v. M.N .R ., '[1962] S.C.R .
570; Premium Iron Ores Ltd. v. M.N.R ., [1966] S.C .R. 685; M.N.R . v.
Imperial Oil Ltd., [1960] S .C.R . 735; M.N.R . v. Sedgwick, [1964] S.C.R.
177; Highway Sawmills Ltd. v. M.N .R ., [1966] S.C .R. 384; Curran v.
M;N .R ., [1959] S.C.R . 850; Regal Heights Ltd. v. M.N.R ., [1960] S.C :
902; Orlando v. M.N .R ., [1962] S.C.R . 261; Oxford Motors Ltd. v. M.N.R .,
[1959] S.C.R . 548; Canadian General Electric v. M,N.R., .[1962] S.C .R . 3;
Falconer v. M.N.R ., [1962] S.C.R . 664.
'Y
R.S.C., 1952, c. 100. The Queen v. Premier Mouton Products Inc.,
[1961] S.C .R. 361 ; Pfizer Corporation v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R . 449;
The Queer: v. Mead lohson of Canada Ltd., [1966] S.C .R. 457 ; The Queen
v. Veaver Lamb and Shearling Co. Ltd., [1960] S .C.R . .505 ; Deputy Minister of National Revenue (Customs sand Excise) v. Consolidated Denison
Mines Ltd. and Rio Tinto~ Mining Co. of Canada, [1966] S.C.R . 8; and
Rexair of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, [1958] S.C .R. 577.
'a Toronto General Trusts
Corporation v. M.N.R ., [1958] S.C .R. 499;
M.N .R . v. Smith, [1960] S.C.R . 477, and M.N.R . v. Rickle, [1966] S.C .R.
479.
°' R.S .C ., 1952, c. 58 ; Customs Tariff Act, R.S.C ., 1952, c. 60 . Dominion
Engineering Works Ltd. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue and
A . B. Wing Ltd., [1958] S.C.R. 652. On appeal by A. B. Wing Ltd., against
the imposition of customs duty with respect to a power shovel which it
imported, the Tariff Board reversing the decision of the Deputy Minister
of National Revenue, imposed a lower rate of duty. On further appeal to
the Exchequer Court ([1956] Ex . C.R . 379), and the Supreme Court of
Canada by Dominion Engineering Works Limited, an intervenor, the Deputy
Minister, notwithstanding that the Tariff Board had reversed his decision,
appeared as respondent, supporting the Board's decision as one based on a
finding of fact and, therefore, not subject to judicial review under the Customs Act, s. 45 . Although the majority justices dismissed the appeal (there-
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Act,' one case arising under the British Columbia Social Services
Tax Act," and three cases arising under municipal taxing by-laws ."
The T scale is constructed to make possible an examination of
the effect of the justices' votes on demands made by government
for the payment of taxes, and on attempts by taxpayers to resist
such demands . A vote favouring the taxpayer's attempt to resist
payment or reducing the amount payable is classified as affirmative,
and a vote favouring the government's claim is classified as negative. Accordingly, an affirmative vote upholds the interest of the
taxpayer, whether an individual, or a business organization,"
against the claims of government, and, speaking generally, favours
individual and corporate enterprise and the retention of wealth by
those who have acquired it through industry, investment, or good
fortune . A negative vote, upholding a claim for taxes, is one
which supports the revenue demands of government and thereby
makes possible the fulfilment of government commitments and
the expansion of government functions, including the expansion
of social services . At least where the tax imposed is "progressive",
a negative vote tends to redistribute wealth from those who have
more to those who have less.
The R and S coefficients'' are .93 and .77 respectively . As the
difference between the observed consistency and the least possible
consistency (computed for cases)" given the structure of the scale
is .20, the increase in consistency is considerable . Therefore, if
the scale is taken to be a cumulative scale and if scalability at the
conventional levels is accepted as establishing unidimensionality,
one would conclude that the scale indicates that the justices reach
their decisions on the basis of their attitudes to taxation. As I indicated above, I am not prepared to draw such a conclusion from
scales of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada ."
by, in effect, upholding the Deputy Minister's submission) I classify their
votes as affirmative, as they affirmed the imposition of a lower rate of duty.
"R.S.B.C., 1948, c. 333, ss. 3(1), 5(h) ; The Queen V, Alaska Pine and
Cellulose Ltd ., [19601 S.C.R. 686 .
4o
Seneca and Cayuga Separate School Board of Trustees v. Township
of Seneca, [1964] S .C.R . 569 ; Worldwide Evangelization Crusade v . Beantsville, [1960] S.C.R. 49, and Ottawa v. Royal Trust Company, [1964] S.C.R.
526.
'But note that in Seneca and Cayuga Separate School Board of Trustees v. Seneca, ibid ., the taxpayer school board, was itself an organ of
government.
'I have included in the computation of R, decisions in which the court
divided 4-1 and 1-4 . But see, supra, footnote 9.
'~co MMR for justices is .68 ; MMR for cases is .73 .
See supra, text, at footnote 17 ; and footnote 34.
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In spite of the incidence of non-participation" resulting from
the court's practice of sitting in panels, the T scale identifies with
relative clarity four types of voting behaviour.
1 . The voting pattern described for Mr. Justice Cartwright is
identified as pro-taxpayer on the basis of his voting division of
fourteen affirmative and four negative votes ( .78 affirmative) . There
appears to be no reason to adopt the more extreme classification,
highly pro-taxpayer, which is suggested by his scale score of .89,
which reflects his break-point located close to the bottom of the
scale.
2 . The voting patterns described for Taschereau C.J. and for
Ritchie, Spence, Martland and Hall JJ. may be classified as neutral
as between taxpayer and government .
(a) The voting patterns of Taschereau C .J. and Ritchie J . are
identified as pro-taxpayer on the basis of their scale scores of .54
and .39 respectively . However, we adopt the more moderate clas
sification of neutral, indicated by the voting divisions of seven
affirmative and five negative votes ( .58 affirmative) for the Chief
Justice, and seven affirmative and seven negative votes (.50 affirmative) for Ritchie J." (Chief Justice Taschereau's voting division
measure is just below the minimum of .60 which we define as
pro-taxpayer) .
(b) Mr. Justices Spence, Martland and Hall exhibit voting
patterns which are neutral as between taxpayer and government
both on the basis of their scale scores and their voting divisions.
Mr. Justice Spence has a scale score of .14 and a voting division
of five affirmative as against four negative votes ( .56 affirmative) .
Mr . Justice Martland has a scale score of .071, and a voting
division of ten affirmative and nine negative votes ( .53 affirmative) .
Although Mr. Justice Hall is located within the neutral group, it
is suggested that, as he participated in only five cases, any conclusions drawn about his voting pattern are highly tentative and
must await confirmation as further data appears .
3 . The voting patterns of Abbott and Fauteux JJ. may be characterized as pro-government in taxation appeals .

s` The scale contains 146 votes. If nine justices participated in each of
the twenty-eight cases, the scale would contain 252 votes. Accordingly, 106
non-participations result from the court's practice of sitting in panels. An
additional eighty-four non-responses result from the inclusion on the scale
of a column for each of the twelve justices who were on the court at any
time during the eight years investigated .
°' Mr. Justice Ritchie's break-point would have been lower and his scale
score higher if the normal rule requiring cases within the same voting
division group to be ordered according to date were followed . See supra.
footnote 29.
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(a) This classification is given for Abbott J. both by his scale

score of - .43 and by his voting division of four votes in favour
of taxpayers and fourteen votes in favour of government (.22 affirmative) .
(b) lair. Justice Fauteux's voting pattern is classified as progovernment on the basis of his voting division of two affirmative
and six negative votes (.25 affirmative), although his scale score
of - .75 suggests classification as highly pro-government .
Note that the voting division of Mr. Justice Abbott is as progovernment (.22 affirmative) as that of Mr. Justice Cartwright is
pro-taxpayer ( .78 affirmative) .
4. Finally, the T scale indicates that Mr. Justice Judson's voting
pattern is highly pro-government, on the basis both of his scale
score of - .75 and his voting division of nineteen negative votes
in twenty-two participations (.14 affirmative) . Mr. Justice Judson's voting pattern is especially noteworthy, as he participated
in more cases on the T scale than any other justice (twenty-two
out of twenty-eight) and has the most extreme voting pattern.
The T scale describes Chief Justice Kerwin's voting pattern as
pro-government on the basis of both his voting division ( .30
affirmative) and scale score (- .57), and Mr. Justice Locke's as
pro-taxpayer on the basis of his voting division (.60 affirmative)
and neutral on the basis of his scale score ( - .036) . However,
no conclusions should be drawn about these justices until scales
containing all divided taxation appeals in which they participated
during their full terms on the court have been prepared and
analysed .
The T scale, of course, gives no information about Mr. Justice
Rand's voting pattern in taxation appeals.
Two subscales of the T scale have been prepared to facilitate
the description of the justices' voting patterns-the Income Tax
subscale (I), and the Excise Tax subscale (E), containing respec
tively the fourteen income tax appeals and the six excise tax appeals
appearing on the T scale." The ranking of the justices on the I
subscale is identical with that on the T scale, with the exception
of Fauteux J. who precedes Kerwin C.J. on the subscale solely
sa The I subscale has an R of .92 and an S of .67. The difference between
the observed consistency and the least possible consistency (computed for
justices) given the structure of the subscale is .17. (MMR for justices is
.75; MMR for cases is .70.)
The E subscale (composed of only six cases) has no inconsistent votes.
Accordingly, R and S are each 1.00. MMR for justices is .87 ; MMR for
cases is .77.
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because he did not participate in case number 58-597. The six
negative votes which appear inconsistent on the T scale remain
inconsistent on the I subscale .
On the E subscale, Fauteux J. ranks fourth by reason of his
affirmative vote in 61-361 which appears as an inconsistency on
the T scale. The justices in the fifth to tenth positions on the E
subscale cast no affirmative votes, and their ranking is based on
their non-participations which determine the positions of their
break-points . Rand and Hall JJ. cast no votes in appeals appearing
on the E subscale.
Mr. Justice Cartwright, who appears at the extreme left side
the
T scale, and exhibits the only voting pattern identified as
of
pro-taxpayer, cast affirmative votes in eight of the ten income tax
appeals in which he participated,' and in the three excise tax
appeals," one death duty appeal" and two of the three" appeals
arising under municipal taxing by-laws in which he participated .
He cast six affirmative votes in cases appearing on the lower half
of the T scale, in which he was in dissent, and in five of those
cases he dissented alone. His voting pattern suggests the hypothesis
that he may be inclined as a matter of policy to favour the taxpayer in taxation appeals, at least where it is open upon the law
for him to do so. I propose to attempt to determine whether the
three inconsistent negative votes which he cast in cases on the T
scale may be explained consistently with that hypothesis .
In The Queen v. Alaska Pine &. Cellulose Ltd.` (60-686),
Cartwright J., dissenting in part and voting negatively and inconsistently, held that section 5 of the British Columbia Social Ser
vices Tax Act" which exempts from sales tax material used as a
"direct agent for the . . . manufacture of a product by contact"
exempts material which comes in contact with the final product of
"See the I subscale . North Bay Mica Co. Ltd. v. M.N.R. (58-597) ;
Evans v. M.N.R. (60-391) ; M.N.R . v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (60-735) ; Regal
Heights Ltd. v. M.N.R. (60-902) ; Orlando v. M.N.R. (62-261) ; Oxford
Motors Ltd. v. M .N.R. (59-548) ; Can . Gen . Elec. v. M.N.R . (62-3) ;
Falconer v. M.N.R. (62-664), cited, supra, footnote 41.
"See the E subscale. The Queen v. Premier Mouton Products Inc .
(61-361) ; Deputy M.N.R . v. Consolidated Denison Mines Ltd. -et al
(66-8) ; Rexair of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen (58-577), cited, supra, footnote 42.
`Toronto General Trusts Corporation v. M.N.R. (58-499), supra, footnote 43.
"Seneca and Cayuga Separate School Board of Trustees v. Seneca
(64-569) and Worldwide Evangelization Crusade v. Beamsville (60-49) .
He voted negatively in Ottawa v. Royal Trust Co. (64-526), cited, supra,
footnote 46.
'Supra, footnote 45, at p. 694.
°° Ibid.
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the- manufacturing process, but not material which comes in contact only with waste products. He suggested that if the legislature
had intended to exempt the latter material "some such word as
`substance' would have been more appropriate than the word
`product' ". Kerwin C.J .,e° rejecting so narrow an interpretation of
the word "product", held the exemption to be applicable.
Mr . Justice Cartwright's second inconsistent negative vote was
cast in Irrigation Industries Ltd. v. M.N.R . (62--346),°1 in which
he was joined by Judson J. in dissent. The appellant company pur
chased certain speculative shares which the directors intended to
sell at a profit as quickly as possible, and which the company did,
in fact, sell at a profit within a few weeks. Cartwright J., noting
that he was not bound by authority to hold such a profit taxable
in the hands of a party not engaged in the business of trading in
securities, held, however, that the transaction was an adventure
in the nature of trade" and that the profit was subject to income
tax. The effect of his conclusion is to make the determination
whether such a profit is income or capital, depend on the taxpayer's intention at the time the purchase is made . That some other
justices believed that it was not necessary as a matter of law to
adopt this test, is indicated by Mr. Justice Martland's adoption of
a broader test" on the basis of which he held" that the profit was
a capital gain and not taxable.
Mr . Justice Cartwright cast his third inconsistent negative vote
in Highway Sawmills Ltd. v. M.N .R . (66-384) .88 Speaking for the
"Ibid at p. 690, Abbott, Martland and Judson JJ. concurring.
.,
' Supra, footnote 41 .
"Income Tax Act, supra, footnote 41, s. 2a and s. 139(1)8.
es ". . . whether the person dealt with the property in the same way as
a dealer would ordinarily do, and whether the nature and quantity of the
property excludes the possibility that its sale was the realization of a
capital asset." See M.N .R . v. Taylor, [1956] C.T.C. 189.
e4
Supna, footnote 41, at p. 350, Taschereau J., as he then was, and Locke
J., concurring.
"Ibid. In placing this appeal (66-384) on the scale, it was necessary
to choose whether to assign an inconsistent affirmative vote to Ritchie J.,
or an inconsistent negative vote to Cartwright J. See supra, footnote 25 .
The inconsistent vote was assigned to Cartwright J., partly because his
voting pattern suggests that his negative votes are inconsistencies, and
partly because Mr . Justice Ritchie's affirmative vote in Highway Sawmills
seems to be consistent with his affirmative votes in Montreal Trust v.
M.N.R . (62-570) and M.N.R . v. Imperia l Oil (60-735), all being income
tax appeals in which the taxpayers were engaged in the extractive industries.
In placing M.N.R . v. Bickle (66-479) on the scale, it was necessary
to choose whether to assign an inconsistent affirmative vote to Spence J. or
an inconsistent negative vote to Ritchie J. In the absence of strong evidence
to suggest to whom the inconsistency should be assigned, the normal rule
of chronological order was followed, and the inconsistency was assigned to
Spence J. This had the added advantage of producing higher break-points
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majority,' he held that to compute the capital cost allowance to
which a logging company is entitled," it is necessary to deduct
from the cost of the lumber cut, the amount of the proceeds received from the sale of stripped land, despite the fact that, when
the company acquired the land and standing timber, the price was
attributable wholly to the timber and not to the land, and that
the company did not expect to sell the stripped land at a profit.
On the question of statutory construction, Cartwright J. held" that
,words-of the statute and regulations was
as the meaning of the
difficult to ascertain, the court should adopt the construction which
conforms to the apparent scheme of the legislation, Accordingly, it
appears that Mr. Justice Cartwright's decision against the taxpayer resulted from the application of a broad purposive rule of
construction to an ambiguous taxing statute. A decision in favour
of the taxpayer might have been reached by adopting a narrow
rule of construction . That, in effect, was the course adopted by
Ritchie J., who, dissenting, stated that the company's profit was
a windfall which "fall[s] clear of . . . the `rather intricate statutory skein' " of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act."
Thus, Mr. Justice Cartwright's three inconsistent votes occur in
two cases (Alaska Pine, 60-686 and Highway Sawmills, 66-384),
in which he chose a construction of an ambiguous statute more
favourable to the government than to the taxpayer, and a third
case (Irrigation Industries, 62-346) in which, to distinguish income from capital receipts, he applied a test favourable to the
government . In the Alaska Pine case and the Irrigation Industries
case, the majority of judges chose the construction or rule favourable to the taxpayer, although they appear to Mr. Justice Cartwright's right on the scale and hence generally are less likely to
favour taxpayers' claims . In Highway Sawmills, Ritchie J. chose
the construction favourable to the taxpayer.
Is it possible to reconcile Mr. Justice Cartwright's inconsistent
negative votes with the hypothesis suggested by his voting pattern,
that as a matter of policy he votes in favour of taxpayers, where
it is open for him to do so under the applicable statutory and case
law? The inconsistent votes clearly did not promote that policy .
for Ritchie and Spence JJ ., a result which seems to be consistent with their
voting divisions .
Abbott, Judson and Spence JJ ., concurring.
"' See Income Tax Act, supra, footnote 41, ss, 11(1) (a), (b), 20(1),
20(5)(a), (c), (e) ; Income Tax Regulations, ss . 1100(1)(e), 1100(2)
1101(3)(a), (b), 1102(2) and Schedule 3 .
"Supra, footnote 41, at pp, 393-394,
"ibid., at p . 399 .

1967]
The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966
693
®n the other hand, it is difficult to say that they were determined
by the requirements of the applicable law, in an objective sense,
as other justices voted affirmatively.
The explanation may be simply that a justice's view of what
the law permits is a highly individual, even personal matter ; so
that a justice whose decisions generally are based on a certain
policy may, in an individual case, believe that the applicable law
prevents him from giving effect to that policy, even although other
judges, not generally motivated by the policy, believe that the
state of the law does not prevent a decision carrying out that
policy . Mr. Justice Cartwright's negative inconsistent votes are
some evidence that judicial decision-malting is determined not
only by law and policy, but by the ways in which individual
judges in individual cases perceive law and policy.
Chief Justice Taschereau, as may be seen from the 1 and E
subscales, voted affirmatively in three" of the six income tax appeals and two" of the three excise tax appeals which he heard.
Three of his negative votes in income and excise tax appeals occur
in appeals in which the taxpayers were engaged in an extractive
industry. In Montreal Trust Co. v. M.N.R . (62-570),°z he joined
Judson .J., in dissent, to hold that a well-drilling company which
sold part of a mining lease obtained by it in consideration for its
promise to drill an oil well, received the proceeds from the sale
as income not capital . In M.N.R . v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (60-735)"
he concurred with the majority judgment given by Judson J., construing against the interests of the taxpayer a regulation governing
the method of calculating the depletion allowance on oil wells ."
In Deputy M.N.R . v.. Consolidated benison Mines (66-g), °6 an
excise tax appeal, he concurred with Spence J. that certain "rock
bolts" used in the construction of mine shafts were structural devices, not safety devices, and accordingly were not exempt from
sales tax."
"Evans v . M.N .R. (60-391) ; Irrigation Industries Ltd. v. M.N.R . (62346) and Curran v . M .N.R . (59-950), supra, footnote 41 .
"The Queen v. Premier Mouton Products Inc. (61-361) and The
Queen v . Beaver Lamb and Shearling Co. Ltd. (60-505), discussed infra,
text at footnotes 91 and 94 .
"Supra, footnote 41 .
73 7bïd.
44
Regulation 1201 passed under the Income Tax Act. The majority held
that to compute the profits to establish the base on which the depletion
allowance is calculated, it is necessary to deduct from the profits attributable
to profitable wells, all losses and costs which the company. deducts in determining its taxable income. The minority held that it is necessary to
deduct only the expenses related to profitable wells.
°6
Supra, footnote 42 .
"Nnder The Excise Tax Act, supra, footnote 42, ss . 30, 32 and schedule
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Mr. Justice Martland's voting behaviour in appeals involving
the liability of taxpayers engaged in the extractive industries"
contrasts with that of Taschereau C.J. Martland J. voted in favour
of taxpayers engaged in the extractive industries in three income
tax appeals and in the provincial sales tax appeal in which such
taxpayers were parties. Thus, he voted affirmatively with the
majority in the Montreal Trust Co . case (62-570) in which Taschereau J., as he then was, voted negatively in dissent; and he
voted affirmatively in dissent in the Imperial Oil case (60-735),
in which Taschereau J., as he then was, voted negatively with the
majority. Again, he voted affirmatively in North Bay Mica Co . v.
M.N.R . (58-597),'8 holding that a mica mine abandoned in 1947
and reactivated by new owners in 1950 "came into production" on
the latter date, and so qualified for an exemption," and in The
Queen v. Alaska Pine and Cellulose Ltd. (60-686) ."

Mr. Justice Martland voted negatively in the three excise tax
cases in which he participated, holding that the dietary aids "Metrecal" (66-457) ' and "Limmits" (66-459)' are pharmaceutical,
rather than foodstuff, and hence subject to sales tax. In Rexair of
Canada v. The Queen (58-577),8' he agreed with the majority that
where articles of trade were manufactured by one company for
another to which they were sold, the second company reselling to
its distributors, the sales tax was payable on the higher price which
obtained in the second sale,
Mr. Justice Abbott, whose voting pattern in taxation cases has
been classified as pro-government, voted negatively in the five
excise tax appeals" and in seven of the eight income tax appeals"

3. Abbott and Ritchie JJ. also concurred with Spence J. Cartwright J. dissented .
z' Martland J. voted affirmatively in Premium Iron Ores Ltd. v. M.N .R .
(66-685), supra, footnote 41 . However, the issue in that case (the deductibility of legal expenses incurred in resisting a foreign income tax claim)
was not related to the- extractive industries as such. He also voted affirmatively in Falconer v. M.N .R . (62-664), supra, footnote 41 .
'a
Supra, footnote 41 . Martland J. concurred with Cartwright J.
'Under s. 85(5) of the Income Tax Act, supra, footnote 41, Kerwin
C.J ., speaking for himself and Judson J. in dissent, held, ibid, at p, 601,
that the mine was the same physical thing as that operated by the previous
owner and "came into production" prior to 1946, and did not qualify for
the exemption.
'Supra, footnote 45 ; discussed, supra, text at footnote 58 .
The Queen v. Mead Johnson of Canada Ltd., supra, footnote 42 .
"Pfizer Corporation v. The Queen, ibid.
Rexair of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, ibid.
`~ See the E subscale . The Queen v. Premier Mouton Products, Inc.;
Pfizer Corporation v. The Queen ; The Queen v. Mead Johnson of Canada
Ltd.; Deputy Minister of National Revenue v. Consolidated Denison Mines
Ltd., and Rexair of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, ibid.
' See the I subscale . Premium Iron Ores Ltd . v. M.N.R.; M.N .R . v.
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in which he participated . His four affirmative votes occur in the
only appeal on the T scale arising°under a provincial taxing statute
(60-686),8" in one of the two appeals in which he was called upon
to consider municipal taxing by-laws (64-569),8° in one of the
two death duty appeals which he heard (60-477) 88 and in one
income tax appeal (58-597) .' Prior to his appointment to the
court in 1954, Mr. Justice Abbott served as Minister of Finance
in the federal government for seven years.
Mr. Justice Fauteux, immediately to the right of Abbott J. on
the T scale and with a pro-government voting pattern, voted negatively in six of his eight participations s° His inconsistent affirmative
vote on the T scale (which appears as a consistent vote on the E
subscale) occurred in The Queen v. Premier Mouton Products Inc .
(61-361) ."1 In that case, the taxpayer brought a petition of right to
recover excise tax paid by it several years earlier under protest,
in the face of threats by officers of the Department of National
Revenue to have the company's licence cancelled. Mr. Justice
Fauteux" held that the moneys were paid under duress, and,
therefore, that the company's claim was not barred by the limitation period applicable to claims for a refund of moneys paid under
mistake of law or fact .'
Mr. Justice Fauteux clearly viewed the case as one raising, as
a primary issue, the question of the proper limits to be placed on
the use of threats by civil servants . His inconsistent affirmative vote
may perhaps be explained on that basis. Whether Mr. Justice
Sedgwick; Highway Sawmills Ltd. v . M .N.R .; Orlando v . M.N.R .; Oxford
Motors Ltd. v . M.N .R . ; Can . Gen . Elec .' v . M.N .R ., and Falconer v .
M .N.R ., cited, supra, footnote 41 .
' The Queen v . Alaska Pine and Cellulose Ltd., supra, footnote 45,
discussed supra, text at footnote 58 .
'Seneca and Cayuga Separate School. Board of Trustees v. Seneca,
supra, footnote 46 . Abbott J . concurred with Cartwright J., who, speaking
for the majority, held that lands and buildings owned by the school board
but no longer used as a school, were exempt from taxation. The Assessment Act, R .S .O ., 1960, c . 23, ss . 4 and 9. Judson J . dissented .
I M.N.R . v. Smith, supra, footnote 43 (construction of the Dominion
Succession Duty Act, R .S.C ., 1952, c. 89, ss . 3(1)(c) and (4) .
'North Bay Mica Co . Ltd. v. M_N .R ., supra, footnote 41 ; discussed,
supra, text at footnote 7g .
'Three income tax appeals : Evan's v . M .N.R .; Regal Heights Ltd. v.
M.N.R ., and Oxford Motors Ltd. v. M .N .R ., cited, supra, footnote 41 ; one
excise tax appeal, The Queen v. Beaver Lamb and Shearling Co. Ltd.,
cited, supra, footnote 42 ; one death duty appeal, M.N.R . v . Smith, supra,
footnote 43 ; and one appeal arising under a municipal taxing by-law,
Ottawa v . Royal Trust Co ., supra, footnote 46.
"` Supra, footnote 42 .
"z Cartwright J., concurred, and Taschereau J., as he then was, agreed in
separate reasons . Abbott J . (Kerwin C.J. concurring), dissented, holding
that the limitation period was applicable .
" Excise Tax Act,, supra, footnote 42, s . 46(6) .
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Fauteux's vote in the appeal is in accord with his voting pattern in
other cases raising that issue is beyond the scope of this article."
Mr. Justice Judson, the only justice with a strongly progovernment voting pattern, voted negatively in nineteen of the
twenty-two appeals in which he participated, including eight
appeals in the top half of the T scale in which he was in dissent.
His only affirmative votes appear in a death duty appeal (58-499),9
an appeal arising under the federal Customs Act (58-652) 9° and
The Queen v. Alaska Pine, the only appeal on the scale arising
under a provincial statute (60-686) .G'
$

B) The Negligence Scale

The Negligence Scale (N)" contains twenty-seven divided decisions in negligence appeals heard by the Supreme Court of
Canada after January 15th, 1958, and reported in the 1958 to

"In The Queen v. Beaver Lamb and Shearling Co . (60-505), ibid ., an
earlier case raising the same issue, Fauteux J. agreed with Kerwin C.J .
that the taxes were paid under a mistake of law rather than under duress,
and therefore that the claim was barred by s. 46(6). Chief Justice
Taschereau upheld the taxpayer's claim in both appeals.
es Toronto General Trusts Corporation v, M.N .R ., supra, footnote 43,
Judson J. held that where a beneficiary under a will predeceases the testator,
but the gift is prevented from lapsing by s. 36(1) of the Wills Act, R.S .O .,
1950, c. 426 (which provides that the gift shall take effect as if the beneficiary died immediately after the testator) and passes under the beneficiary's will to his beneficiary, there is only one succession within the
meaning of the Succession Duty Act, supra, footnote 88, ss, 2(m) and 3(1)i,
and only one duty is payable. Martland J. dissented, casting his single inconsistent vote on the T scale.
Dominion Engineering Works Ltd. v. Deputy M.N.R ., supra, footnote 44 .
"I The Queen v. Alaska Pine and Cellulose Ltd., supra, footnote 45, discussed, supra, text at footnote 58 .
88 I have omitted from the N scale four appeals involving claims in tort
against police officers . These appeals are perhaps related both to the N
scale and to the C scale, infra . They have been gathered together in a
separate scale, which is shown below. In Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C .R.
321, the plaintiff was awarded damages against a police officer for false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. In Beim v. Goyer, [1965] S.C.R .
638, the plaintiff obtained damages for injuries negligently inflicted by a
police officer during pursuit. In Priestman v. Colangelo, Shynall and Stnythson, [1959] S.C .R. 615, the administrators of the estates of two bystanders
who were killed during a pursuit by police officers of a third party, did not
succeed in their action for damages. In Kirkpatrick v. Lament, [1965]
S.C.R . 538, the plaintiff, who alleged that the defendant police officer used
excessive force to effect an arrest, did not succeed in his action for damages.
C A R H S Ra K T L M J F
59-321 Lamb
+ -(- . - -{- -l- . - 6-3
. . -}- . -{65-638 Behn
-}- - - 6-3
59-615 Priestman
-(- -{- - 2-3
65-538 Kirkpatrick -I1-4
-]- - pro-plaintiff
- - pro-defendant police officer.
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1966 volumes of the Supreme Court Reports. Included on this
scale are fourteen motor vehicle appeals," four appeals involving
the liability of occupiers to persons (invitees) on their premises,"'
The voting pattern described in these cases is perhaps not highly significant, considering the small number of cases and the large number of nonparticipations . However, the voting patterns described for Cartwright,
Judson and Fauteux JJ . appear to resemble their voting patterns on the
C scale more closely than their voting patterns on the N scale.
I have also omitted from the N scale Cauchon v. La Commission des
Accidents du Travail de Quebec, [1964] S.C .R. 395 ; The Workmen's Compensation Commission paid compensation to R, an employee of L, a
heating contractor, for injuries caused to R, while working on C's premises,
by the explosion of a heater which C had engaged L to repair. Abbott J.
(Taschereau C.J . and Fauteux and Spence JJ . concurring), upheld the
judgment obtained by the Commission against C for the amount of the
compensation paid to R, and dismissed C's appeal in his action against L
for indemnity, on the ground that the court ought not to interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact of the trial judge and the majority of the Court
of Appeal, that as between C and L the explosion was caused by C's
negligence . Cartwright J., dissenting, held, at p. 400, that, as between C
and L, the explosion was caused by L's negligence . He would have dismissed both the Commission's action against C and C's action against L, as
to allow both actions would require L to pay the damages suffered by his
employee, and that result is contrary to the Workmen's Compensation Act,
R.S .Q., 1964; c . 159 .
The appeal is omitted from the N scale as the majority and minority .
votes cannot be polarized as required by the scale classification . The
majority votes may be classified only as negative, as they deny recovery by
C against L. On the other hand, Mr . Justice Cartwright's vote may not be
classified as affirmative as its effect is to dismiss the actions against C and L.
Mr. Justice Abbott's reasons indicate that the majority based its votes
on its view that the court should exercise restraint in dealing with factfinding by lower courts . It might well be rewarding to develop scales of
cases in which such judicial restraint is a major issue, as the Reports contain numerous references to it . See, for example, the following cases on
the N scale: Fleming v. Atkinson, [1959] S.C .R. 513 ; Ratté v . Provencher,
[1964] S .C .R . 606 ; Gilchrist v . A . & R . Farms Ltd., [1966] S.C .R. 122;
Radclyfle v. Rennie and McBeath, [1965] S.C .R. 703, and Kauflman v.
Toronto Transit Commission, [1960] S .C .R . 251 . Cartwright J., dissenting,
while he departed from the facts as found by the lower courts, treated the
case as turning on the effect to be given to the Workmen's Compensation
Act. His vote may be interpreted as one protecting the individual C,
from liability at the suit of a government agency, and seems to conform
to his voting pattern on the T and C scales, involving disputes between the
individual and the state.
"Lehnert v. Stein, [1963] S.C.R . 38 ; Dormuth et al v . Untereiner et at,
[1964] S .C.R . 122; Gorman v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario
Ltd. et al, [1966] S.C.R . 13 ; Gagnon v . Derov, [1958] S .C .R . 708 ; Roundeu
v . Osborne, [1965] S .C.R . 145 ; Corrie v. Gilbert ; [1965] S.C .R . 457 ; Ratté
v . Provencher, [1964] S.C .R. 606 ; Stirling Trusts Corpn . v . Postrna et al,
[1965] S .C .R . 324 ; Co-operators Insurance Association v . Kearney, [1965]
S.C .R . 106 ; Hunt and Mayo v . MacLeod Construction Co. Ltd. e t al,
[1958] S .C.R . 737 ; Driver et al . v . Coca-Cola Ltd., [1961] S .C .R . 201 ;
Robitaille v. Procureur Général de Quebec, [1963] S .C .R . 186; Hossack et
al v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario Ltd . e t al, [1966] S .C .R . 28 ;
O'Brien v. Mailhot, [1966] S .C .R . 171 .
"Carriss v. Buxton, [1958] S .C.R . 441 ; McCormack v. T . Eaton Co .
Ltd., [1963] S .C .R . 180 ; Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada  [19641 S.C .R .
85 ; Kaufjrnan v . Toronto Transit Commission, [19601 S.C .R . 251 .
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and two decisions concerning damage caused by ships." The six
remaining appeals involve the liability of a farmer for animals
wandering unattended on the highway," manufacturer's liability,""'
an employer's liability to his employee," medical negligence,"' the
liability of a "gardien juridique" under article 1054 of the Quebec
Civil Code,"' the liability of a municipal corporation for property
damage caused by a drainage ditch... and the liability of a summer
camp to a camper.""
The scale is constructed so as to examine the effect of the
justices' votes on claims by plaintiffs to recover compensation for
injuries they have suffered. A vote favouring a plaintiff's claim is
classified as affirmative, and a vote denying or restricting his claim
is classified as negative . Thus, an affirmative vote often promotes
the wide distribution of the risks inherent in an industrialized
mechanized society (as in motor vehicle negligence cases), and
is often a vote against an insurance company (as in motor vehicle
cases, occupiers' liability and medical negligence cases), or against
a business or governmental organization (as in some occupier's
liability and manufacturer's liability cases), and in favour of the
private citizen. Of course, an affirmative vote is not a vote in
favour of an individual as opposed to a large organization, where,
for example, both plaintiff and defendant are organizations of approximately equal size.
The R and S coefficients are .87 ... and .61 . The former is below
the minimum accepted as evidencing unidimensionality on Guttman scales . Therefore, it cannot be said, on the basis of Guttman
theory, that the decisions are based on the judges' attitudes toward
recovery of damages by plaintiffs . However, it should be noted
that the difference between the observed consistency and the least
possible consistency given the structure of the scale (computed for
justices),"" is .17. Therefore, the improvement in consistency is
not inconsiderable .
Marwell Equipment Ltd. et al v. Vancouver Tug Boat Co . Ltd., [19611
'°1

S.C .R . 43 ; Gartland Steamship Co . v. The Queen, [1960] S .C.R . 315.
1M
Fleming v. Atkinson, [19591 S .C .R . 513 .
10
.9
Hobbs Manufacturing v. Shields, [1962] S .C.R . 716.
1M
Gilchrist v. A . & R. Farms Ltd., [1966] S .C.R . 122.
1" Radclyffe v. Rennie and McBeath, [1965] S .C.R . 703.
"'M. & W. Cloaks Ltd. v. Cooperberg and Davis, [1959] S .C .R . 785.
"District of North Vancouver v . McKenzie Barge and Marine Ways
Ltd., [1965] S.C .R . 377.
loan Grieco and Zicardi v. L'Externat Classique Ste. Croix, [1962] S.C.R .
519.
'See, e .g., M. & W. Cloaks Ltd. v . Cooperberg & Davis, supra, footnote 106.
' I have included in the computation of R, decisions in which the court
divided 4-1 and 1-4. But see, supra, footnote 9.
uo MMR for justices is .70;
MMR for cases is .69.
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In spite of the high incidence of nonparticipation"' resulting
from the court's practice of sitting in panels, the N scale identifies,
in broad outline, four fairly clearly defined types of voting behaviour .
1 . Mr. Justice Hall's voting pattern may be classified as strongly
pro-plaintiff on the basis both of his scale score of 1 .00 and his
voting division of 1 .00 affirmative, indicating that the effect of
his votes in the six cases in which he participated was to support
the plaintiff's claim.
2. The voting patterns described for Spence and Cartwright JJ.,
and Taschereau C.J. may be classified as pro-plaintiff.
(a) Mr. Justices Spence and Cartwright have voting patterns
which may be classified as highly pro-plaintiff on the basis of their
scale scores of .93 and .81 but only as pro-plaintiff on the basis of
their voting divisions. Spence J ., whose votes supported the plaintiff in seven of his nine participations, has a voting division measure of .78 affirmative (just short of the minimum of .80 which is
defined as highly pro-plaintiff) . Cartwright J voted in favour of
plaintiffs' claims in thirteen of nineteen participations and his
voting division measure is .68 affirmative.
(b) Chief Justice Taschereau's voting pattern is classified as
pro-plaintiff on the basis of both his scale score of .44 and his
voting division of .67 affirmative. The effect of his votes was to
uphold plaintiff's claim in eight of the twelve appeals he heard.
3. The scale describes neutral voting patterns for Judson, Martland, Fauteux and Ritchie JJ.
(a) Mr. Justice Judson's voting pattern may be classified as
pro-plaintiff on the basis of his scale score of .33 which reflects
his break-point after the eighteenth case on the scale. As a
result of his low break-point, he appears in the sixth position on
the scale immediately to the right of Taschereau C.J. However,
he casts twelve of his twenty-one votes in favour of defendants
(six inconsistently) and his voting division measure of .43 affirmative suggests a classification of neutral, with a pro-defendant tendency . I argue, infra, that a classification of neutral with a proplaintiff tendency is more accurate .
"' The- scale contains 137 votes . If nine justices participated in each of
the twenty-seven cases, the scale would contain 243 votes. Thus, 106 nonparticipations result from the court's practice of sitting in panels . An additional eighty-one non-responses result from inclusion on the scale of a
column for each of the twelve justices who held office during the eight years
under review .

1967]

The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966

703

(b) Mr. Justice Martland's voting pattern may be classified
as neutral both on the basis of his scale score of - .11 and his
voting division ( .53 affirmative) of eight affirmative and seven
negative votes. His voting pattern is one in which support of and
opposition to plaintiffs' claims in these actions is evenly balanced .
(c) Mr. Justice Fauteux's voting pattern is classified as neutral
on the basis of his voting division of five affirmative and four negative votes ( .56 affirmative), notwithstanding his high break-point,
by reason of which he is located in the eleventh place on the N
scale and-has a scale score of - .48 which. suggests a classification
of pro-defendant . As the N scale covers only one-half of Mr.
Justice Jcauteux's term' on the bench, and as he participated in
only nine appeals on the scale, the classification of his voting
pattern as neutral must be considered tentative, and final classification must await the preparation and analysis of scalograms
covering his entire term on the court.
(d) Mr . Justice Ritchie's voting pattern is classified as neutral
on the basis of his scale score of - .19, and as pro-defendant on
the basis. of his voting division of .35 affirmative (eleven votes in
favour of defendants in seventeen participations) . Adopting the
less extreme measure, we classify his voting pattern as neutral.
4. Mr. Justice Abbott's voting pattern is classified as pro-defendant
on the basis of his scale score of - .41 . His voting division of ten
pro-defendant votes in thirteen participations (.23 affirmative)
also suggests classification as pro-defendant .
The N scale does not give a reliable indication of the voting
patterns of Kerwin C. J. and Rand and 1,ocke JJ. as it covers only
a few years of the tenure of these justices .
The N scale is divided into two subscales' The Motor Vehicle
subscale (MV), contains the fourteen cases on the N scale which
raise a question concerning the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle. The second subscale contains the remaining thirteen cases

I The MV subscale produces an R coefficient of .94 and an S coefficient
of .76. Therefore, the minimum degree of consistency required by Guttman
theory is met. However, the difference between the observed consistency
and the least possible consistency given the structure of the subscale (computed for justices) is .10, an improvement which cannot be considered to be
significant. (MMR for justices is .84; MMR for cases is .70) .
The subscale of cases other than motor vehicle cases produces an R
coefficient of .90, and an S coefficient of .67. Therefore, the minimum
degree of consistency required by Guttman theory is met. The difference
between the observed consistency and the least possible consistency given
the structure of the subscale, computed for justices, is .16, a relatively
large improvement. (MMR for justices is .74; MMR for cases is .69) .

704

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[VOL. XLV

on the N scale . The changes in rank order of Judson J. on the MV
subscale and of Cartwright and Fauteux JJ . on the second subscale
appear to be significant and are discussed infra. The changes in
rank order of Kerwin C.J. and of Locke and Hall JJ. are caused
largely by their limited number of participations and are not significant.
" Mr. Justice Hall holds the first position on the left side of the
N scale by reason of the fact that all his votes, including that in
the last case on the scale, supported the plaintiffs' claims. Although
he participated in only six appeals (four motor vehicle negligence,"'
one occupier's liability'.` and one employer's liability),"' these are
fairly well distributed along the scale. However, he participated
in only one decision" i n the bottom third of the scale, which contains appeals decided against plaintiffs . If he had participated in a
larger number of those cases and had voted affirmatively, the
evidence supporting his location on the extreme left of the scale
would be more complete. Yet, his voting record appears to justify
our placing him in that position, at least until further data becomes
available.
Spence J ., immediately to the right of Hall J. on the N scale,
with a pro-plaintiff voting pattern, participated in eleven appeals,
and voted affirmatively in nine, including five motor vehicle ap
peals,"' one occupier's liability appeal"' and one appeal in an action brought against a municipality for damage caused to realty by
the operation of a muncipal drainage ditch."' Of his two negative
"3 Dormuth v. Untereiner (64-122) ; Corrie v. Gilbert (65-457) ; Stirling
Trusts Corpn. v. Postma (65-324) and O'Brien v. Mailhot (66-171), cited,
supra, footnote-99.
"` Campbell v. Royal Batik of Canada (64-85), supra, footnote 100
(defendant bank held liable for injuries sustained when plaintiff customer
slipped on melted snow allowed by the bank to collect on the bank floor,
and constituting an "unusual danger") . Judson and Hall JJ, concurred with
Spence J; Martland and Ritchie JJ . dissented .
"' Gilchrist v. R . & R. Farms Ltd. (62-122),
supra, footnote 98 (defendant employer held liable to employee for failure to provide a safe place
to work) . Judson and Hall JJ . concurred with Cartwright J. Martland and
Ritchie JJ . dissented.
"'O'Brien v. Mailhot (66-171) . Hall J., dissenting alone, held that a
motorist was negligent in not keeping a proper look-out when, after stopping
in a school zone, he proceeded on the signal of a traffic officer and injured
the plaintiff's son. Spence J., casting his only consistent negative vote on the
N scale, concurred with Abbott J., as did Fauteux and Ritchie JJ .
. .. Gorman v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario Ltd. (66-13) ;
Ratté v. Provencher (66-606) ; Stirling Trust Corpn. v. Postma ('65-324) ;
Co-operators Insurance Associations v. Kearney (65-106) ; and Hossack v.
Hertz Drive Yourself Stations of Ontario Ltd. (66-28), supra, footnote 99 .
"Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada (64-85), supra, footnotes 100 and
114.
"' North Vancouver v. McKenzie Barge and
Marine Ways Ltd. (65-377) .
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votes, one cast in O'Brien v. Mailhot (66-171),° a motor vehicle
case, appears as a consistent vote on the hl scale; the second, cast
in Radclyffe v. Rennie and McBeath (65-703)," an action for
medical malpractice, appears inconsistent . In the latter appeal,
Spence J. refused to disturb the finding of the trial judge, that the
plaintiff had failed to establish that the surgical gauze of which she
complained had been left in her body during an operation performed by the first defendant doctor in 1959, rather than during
an operation performed by the second defendant doctor in 1944 .
(The action with respect to the earlier operation was statutebarred.)'
Cartwright J., located on the N scale immediately to the right
of Spence J., participated in nineteen appeals . He voted to uphold
plaintiff's claims for compensation in thirteen appeals, that is, in
more than two-thirds of his participations, including five appeals
in the bottom third of the scale, in which the majority of the court
voted against recovery by the plaintiffs . His voting pattern was
classified as pro-plaintiff .
Mr. Justice Cartwright's voting pattern on the subscale of
motor vehicle appeals differs from his voting pattern on the subscale of other appeals . On the former subscale, he voted affirma
tively in eight of the ten appeals in which he participated.'
His only inconsistent negative vote. .. was cast in Co-operators
Insurance Association v. Kearney (65-106) ." In that case, the
Spence J., dissenting, held that the Municipal Act, R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 255,
s. 529, which prohibits the bringing of an action against a municipality for
damages arising out of the operation of a ditch authorized by s. 527, did
not bar the action where, as here,'the ditch constituted a nuisance or had
been negligently constructed. Furthermore, he held that the construction
of the ditch was not authorized by s. 527. Martland J. (Abbott, Judson
and Ritchie JJ. concurring), held that the section was applicable and that
the plaintiff could seek compensation only through arbitration as provided
by s. 478(1) .
Discussed supra, footnote 116.
"Supra, footnote 105 .
' Abbott and Ritchie JJ. concurred with Spence J. Cartwright J. (Judson
J. concurring), dissented, holding that the plaintiff had established her claim
against the doctor who operated in 1959.
'Lehnert v. Stein (63-38) ; Gorman v. Hertz Drive Yourself Stations
of Ontario Ltd. (66-13) ; Gagnon v. Deroy (58-708) ; Ratté v. Provencher
(64-606) ; Stirling Trust Corpn . v. Postma (65-324) ; Hunt and Mayo v .
MacLeod Construction Co . Ltd. (58-737) ; Driver et al v . Coca-Cola Ltd .
(61-201) ; and Robitaille v. Procureur G9n6ral de Qu9bec (63-186), supra,
footnote 99.
"He voted negatively and consistently in Hossack v . Hertz (66-28),
supra, footnote 99, to uphold the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal
reducing the amount of general damages from - $94,000 .00 to $65,000.00 .
Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ. concurred, each giving separate reasons
for judgment. Spence J., dissenting, would have awarded $82,360 .00 as
general damages .
'~ See, supra, footnote 99 .
"R.S.O., 1960, c. 172.
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plaintiff brought action against his employer for damages for injuries he sustained while riding, during the course of his employment, in an automobile owned by his employer and driven by a
fellow employee, whose negligence was found to be the cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. The majority in the Supreme Court held
that although section 105 (2) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act"
bars the plaintiff's action as gratuitous passenger against the defendant as owner of the automobile, its does not bar his action as
employee against the defendant as employer, for the latter's failure
to take reasonable care to provide for the safety of his employee.
Cartwright J., dissenting, refrained from limiting the effect of the
section in this way . He stated" that as the words of the statute
were "clear and unequivocal the court must give effect to them
although they bring about what in the eyes of the common law
appears to be a grave injustice" ."
On the subscale of non-motor vehicle appeals, Mr. Justice
Cartwright's votes are more evenly balanced between support for
and denial of plaintiffs' claims . He cast four negative votes, and
therefore ranks eleventh on the right side of that subscale,' although he ranks third on both the N scale and the MV subscale .
His five affirmative votes were cast in three occupier's liability
appeals,' :` the employer's liability appeal"" and the medical mal'- Supra, footnote 99, at p. 127.

"Cartwright J. found it impossible to overcome the conceptual difficulty which arises if the plaintiff is allowed to recover against the employer for the driver's negligence . He said, ibid ., at p. 131, ". . . the passenger's right of action is gone because the negligent act, liability for which
is negatived, is as much an essential part of the passenger's cause of action
against his own employer and his cause of action against the employer of
the driver as it is of his cause of action against the driver".
"'On the subscale, the negative votes establish Mr. Justice Cartwright's
break-point after the second case . Thus, his scale score of-.66 on that
subscale classifies his voting division as highly pro-defendant . However,
his voting division of five affirmative and four negative votes ( .56 affirmative) suggests a classification as neutral with a slightly pro-plaintiff tendency.
"' Cariss v. Buxton (58-441) (the defendant hotel was held liable for
damages for the death of a guest caused by a defective heater) . Rand J..
Cartwright J. (Fauteux and Abbott JJ . concurring) ; Locke J. dissenting,
McCormack v. T. Eaton Co . Ltd. (63-180) (new trial directed on application of a plaintiff injured on a department store escalator) . Kerwin C.J .
(Taschereau J., as he then was, and Cartwright and Fauteux JJ . concurring) ; Judson J. dissented. See supra, footnote 100, and infra, footnote 150;
and Kaufman v. T.T.C. (60-251) . Cartwright J. dissenting, held that the
defendant transportation commission owed a duty to the plaintiff invitee, a
user of its escalator, to provide such supervision that the escalator would
be stopped in an emergency. Kerwin C.J . (Judson J. concurring), held that
the defendant had no such duty ; Locke J. (Martland J. concurring), held
that under the circumstances the defendant had no such duty.
'° Gilchrist v. A. do R. Farms Ltd. (66-122), supra. footnote 104.
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practice appeal."'
Mr. Justice Cartwright's voting pattern on the ht scale suggests
the hypothesis that in negligence appeals, where it is possible
upon the law to do so, he attempts, as a matter of policy, to pro
mote the wide distribution of the risks inherent in modern society.
There is little evidence to rebut that hypothesis as an explanation
of his voting behaviour in motor vehicle appeals." However, three
of his negative inconsistent votes cast some doubt on the validity
of that hypothesis as an explanation of his voting behaviour in
the non-motor vehicle appeals. In Hobbs Mfg. Co. v. Shields
(62-716), he dissented to hold that the manufacturer of a defective machine was not liable for damages arising from the death of
an electrician who was electrocuted when, in the course of his
employment with the purchaser of the machine, he connected it
to an electric current ." In Fleming v. Atkinson (59-513), again
dissenting, he held that the farmer-owner of a held adjoining the
highway, has no duty to take reasonable care to keep his farm
animals off the highway and is not liable for the injuries they
cause.' In 1Vlarwell Equipment ltd. v. Vancouver Tug Boat Co .
(61-43), he once again dissented to interpret broadly the exculpatory provisions of section 657(d) of the Canada Shipping Act."
These negative inconsistent votes are not easily reconciled with
the hypothesis suggested above, particularly as they occurred in
appeals in which the majority voted affirmatively and so gave
effect to the policy hypothesized for Mr . Justice Cartwright . As
in the case of Mr. Justice Cartwright's negative inconsistent votes
Radclyle v. Rennie & McBeath, supra, the text at footnote 121.
"Ilis judgment in Co-operators Insurance Association v. Kearney,
discussed supra, at footnote 125, suggests that in that appeal he was of the
view that the words of the statute clearly negatived the plaintiff's claim. It
is true,
of course, that this view was not shared by the majority judges .
131
Cartwright J. concurred with Ritchie J., supra, footnote 103, at p.
728, that the manufacturer was not liable under the doctrine of Donoghue
v. Stevenson, [19321 A.C. 562, as there was a reasonable probability that
the defect would be discovered by examination (i .e . by "grounding" the
machine) before use. Kerwin C.J. (Martland and Judson JJ . concurring),
held, at p. 719, that there was no duty upon the plaintiff to inspect, and
no reason
to do so .
13s
Cartwright J. held, supra, footnote 102, at pp . 531-532, that he was
bound to apply the English rule in Searle v. Wallbank, [19471 A.C . 341.
Locke J. joined Cartwright J. in dissent, but on different grounds. Judson J.
(Fauteux and Abbott JJ . concurring), held that Searle v. Wallbank was
not good law in Ontario. Rand J. (Taschereau J., as he then was, concurring), held the rule to be inapplicable in the circumstances .
:`Supra, footnote 101 . The Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C ., 1952, c. 29 .
Cartwright J. held that the section limits a shipowner's liability not only
for damages caused to another ship but also for the cost of raising and
132
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on the Taxation Scale," these votes may perhaps be explained
as votes which Cartwright J. felt to be dictated by the law as he
saw it. A final judgment on the validity of the hypothesis suggested
above and on the significance of Mr. Justice Cartwright's negative
votes must await an analysis of all his decisions in negligence cases
during his entire term on the bench."
As Judson J. voted against plaintiffs' claims in twelve of his
twenty-one participations (casting six inconsistent negative votes),'"
his voting division ( .43 affirmative) suggests classification as
neutral with a pro-defendant tendency . Nevertheless, it appears
more accurate to classify his voting pattern as neutral with
a pro-plaintiff tendency for two reasons . First, he voted in
favour of plaintiffs' claims in the occupier's liability appeal (6485),"' the appeal considering the scope of section 105(2) of the
Ontario Highway Traffic Act (65-106),"' the employer's liability
appeal (66-122)"_1 and the medical malpractice appeal (65-703)"'
in which all justices to his right on the N scale who participated
voted negatively. His votes in these cases produce the low breakpoint and the scale score of .31 which characterize his voting pattern.
Secondly, four of his six inconsistent negative votes appear to
be votes on the degree of restraint to be exercised by the Supreme
removing the damaged ship . Martland J. (Ritchie and Judson JJ . concurring), restricted the limitation on liability to the first head of damages.
Locke J. joined Cartwright J. in dissent, giving separate reasons.
"Supra, text at footnote 69 and following.
"Mr. Justice Cartwright's inconsistent vote in Gartland Steamship Co .
et al v. The Queen (60-315), supra, footnote 101, is perhaps more readily
explained. In that action, the Crown sought damages from the steamship
company for injuries to a Crown-owned bridge sustained when the bridge
was hit by a ship owned by the appellant company. Judson J. (Taschereau
J., as he then was, and Cartwright J. concurring), apportioned two-thirds
of the fault for the collision to the Crown's servants (although the Exchequer Court judge had absolved them of negligence), and held that the
Crown was not entitled to damages for the loss of use of the channel and
the bridge. Locke J. (Martland J. concurring), dissented on both grounds.
Mr . Justice Cartwright's vote in favour of the defendant in this case, may
perhaps be understood as one which protects a private company from
liability at the suit of the Crown. His negative vote is more consistent with
his voting pattern in taxation, and criminal law cases than it is with his
voting pattern in negligence cases. Nevertheless the case is not omitted
from the N scale as it clearly raises the question of liability for damages
negligently caused and the desirability of insuring against such damages.
`Five of the inconsistent negative votes were cast in motor vehicle
cases (64-122, 66-13, 65-145, 66-457 and 65-324), and, therefore, Judson
J. ranks eleventh on the right side of the MV subscale . He ranks sixth or.
the N scale and the subscale of appeals other than motor vehicle appeals.
"" Campbell v. Royal Bank of Canada, .supra, footnote 114.
"` Co-operators Insurance v. Kearney, supra, text at footnote 125.
"' Gilchrist v. A. & R. Fauns Ltd., .supra, footnote 115.
"Radclyf7e v. Rennie and McBeath, supra, text at footnote 121 .
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Court in the supervision of lower courts, rather than votes on
questions of substantive law relating to plaintiffs' claims for compensation .- His inconsistent negative votes in three motor vehicle
appeals (66-13, 65-145 and 65-457)1'' upheld the decisions of
provincial courts of appeal decreasing the quantum of damages
awarded by the trial judge . He stated that he based his vote on
the view that the Supreme Court should be slow to interfere with
the quantum of damages reviewed and fixed by a court of appeal ."'
Mr. Justice Judson adhered to that view in Hossack v. Hertz (6628),1'' in which he voted consistently negative to uphold the appeal
court's judgment decreasing the award of damages, and in Lehnert
v. Stein (63-38),"4' in which he voted consistently affirmative to
uphold the appeal court's increase in the quantum of damages . The
only appeal in which he did not vote on this basis was Dormuth v.
Untereiner (64-122) 1 in which he voted inconsistently negative
to reverse the appeal court's judgment increasing the quantum of
damages .
Mr. Justice Judson's fifth inconsistent negative vote was cast
in McCormack v. T. Eaton Co . Ltd. (63-180),"'° which again did
not raise a substantive issue. Dissenting, he upheld the manner in
which the trial had been conducted ."'
As Mr. Justice Judson's inconsistent negative votes in Gorman,
Roumieu, Corrie and McCormack were not based on substantive
"44

Gorman v. Hertz, Roumieu v. Osborne and Corrie v. Gilbert, supra,

footnote 99.
Mr. Justice Judson stressed that the task of the Supreme Court is
not to retry the issues (Corrie v. Gilbert, supra, footnote 99, at p. 458),
or to say whether it would have done the same thing as the Court of Appeal
(Roumieu v. Osborne, supra, footnote 99, at p. 148), but only to determine
whether the Court of Appeal committed a reversible error. He concluded
in each case that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the awards
at trial were clearly unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, or so
excessively high as to be clearly erroneous (Hossack v. Hertz, supra, footnote 99, at p. 32) . He stressed that the quantum of damages is related to
local conditions best known to the courts of appeal (Roumieu v. Osborne,
at p. 148), that those courts should have a wide power of review, and that
the Supreme Court, if it recognizes that the case was one for review, should
be slow
to interfere . (Hossack v . Hertz, at p. 34).
'°e
Supra, footnote 99.
"" Ibid . In this case, however, the primary issue discussed by the court
was a question of substantive law-whether the plaintiff's action was barred
by the doctrine volenti non fit injuria .
Supra, footnote 99.
Supra, footnote 100 .
"so Kerwin C.J. (Taschereau
J. as he then was, and Cartwright and
Fauteux JJ. concurring), allowed the plaintiff's appeal and ordered a new
trial, on the ground that the jury had been confused by the supplementary
charges, questions and suggestions put to them by the trial judge, and that
the trial and its results were so unsatisfactory that the verdict could not
stand. The substantive issue-the duty of care owed by a department store
to its customers in connection with an escalator-was not considered.
"45

"4B
"4n
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issues of negligence, it is suggested that, considering the other
features of his voting pattern, they should not be given full weight
in classifying this voting pattern on the N scale. Thus, the evidence
suggests that a classification as neutral with a pro-plaintiff tendency accurately reflects Mr. Justice Judson's voting behaviour
in negligence cases, notwithstanding his voting division. The verification or rejection of this classificaton must, of course, await the
accumulation of further evidence, and further study of the extent
to which judicial restraint plays a significant role in Supreme Court
decision-making ."
Taschereau C.J., whose. voting pattern is classified as proplaintiff, voted affirmatively in four of the seven motor vehicle
appeals in which he participated .''- Of the appeals other than motor
vehicle appeals, he voted affirmatively in an occupier's liability
appeal (63-180), 1' the farm animals appeal (59-513)"` and the
"gardien juridique" appeal (59-785)'" and the summer camp liability appeal (62-519)""1 and negatively in the Crown bridge
appeal (60-315) ."' His only inconsistent vote appears in Gagnon
v. Deroy (58-708) .'5'
" Two possible areas of study are the extent to which the justices defer
to a lower court's finding of fact (see supra, footnote 98), and the extent
to which they defer to the decisions of administrative tribunals . If there
were significant numbers of cases in which the provincial appeal courts
increased and decreased the awards made at trial, it would be possible,
through the use of subscales, to attempt to determine whether the effect of
the justices' votes is to defer to the courts of appeal equally in both types
of cases. It is possible that some justices uphold the appeal courts' decisions
proportionately more frequently when those courts decrease the quantum
of damages than when they increase it or vice versa. If such a voting pattern were revealed by subscales, it would suggest that regardless of what is
said in the reasons for judgment, these justices vote not in response to
deference to appellate courts but in response to the effect of the appellate
courts' awards on the parties . However, such subscales (not reproduced
here) do not show significant results as the number of appeals is too small
and as not all justices participated in all of the relevant appeals . On the
use of subscales see H. J. Spaeth, Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business :
The B Scale in Schubert's Judicial Decision-Making (1963), The Free
Press of Glencoe 79, at pp. 91-100 ; An Analysis of Judicial Attitudes in
the Labor Decisions of the Warren Court (1963), 22 J. of Pol. 290, at
pp. 299-309 .
1G"Dortnuth et al. v. Untereiner et al (64-122) ; Rounderi v. Osborne
(65-145) ; Rattê v. Provencher (64-606) ; and Co-operators Insurance Association v. Kearney (65-106). He voted negatively in Gagnon v. Deroy
(58-708) ; Driver et al v. Coca-Cola Ltd . (61-201) and Robitaille v. Procureur Gënéral de Quëbec (63-186) cited, supra, footnote 99.
"" AlcCormack v. T. Eaton Co. Ltd., supra, footnotes 100 and 150.
"' Fleming v, Atkinson, supra, text at footnote 135.
"M. & 1V. Cloaks Ltd. v. Cooperberg and Davis, infra, footnote 178.
""" Grieco v, L'Externat Classique, supra, footnte 107A.
Gartland Steamship Co . v. The Queen, supra,' footnote 138.
"'This was a motor vehicle negligence appeal arising under the Quebec
Civil Code in which Taschereau C.J. and Fauteux JJ., the only two civilian
1.R

1967]

The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966

71 1

Mr . Justice Martland's votes are fairly evenly divided between
support for plaintiffs and for defendants on both subscales, although his voting pattern slightly favours plaintiffs on the MV sub
scale and defendants on the second subscale . ®n the latter subscale, he voted affirmatively in the appeal interpreting the exculpatory provision of the Canada Shipping Act (61-43) 158 the
manufacturer's liability appeal (62-716) 15° and the Crown bridge
appeal (60-315),1°° his only inconsistent vote on the N scale. He
voted negatively in two occupier's liability appeals (64-85 and
60-251),1°1 the employer's liability appeal (66-122) 1° 2 and the
municipal drainage ditch appeal (65-377) .1°3
The subscales indicate a different type of voting pattern for
Ritchie J. Although his votes in the motor vehicle appeals are
fairly evenly divided (five affirmative and six negative), his votes
in the other appeals uphold the plaintiff's claim in only one appeal
of the six which he heard. He voted affirmatively in the Canada
Shipping Act appeal (61-43),1°4 and negatively in the appeals involving manufacturer's liability (62-716),'°5 occupier's liability
(64-85),1°° employer's liability (66-122),'°' medical malpractice
158 and
(65-703)
the municipal drainage ditch appeal (65-377)'°"
Mr . Justice Abbott's voting patterns on the subscales contrast
judges hearing the appeal, dissented and voted negatively. They held that
the driver of the automobile owned by the defendant, who was regularly
employed as the defendant's chauffeur, was not the defendant's servant at
the time of the accident, and therefore that the defendant was not liable
for damages flowing from the driver's negligence . The majority held that
although the chauffeur was driving without pay, on a Sunday, at the request
of the defendant's nephew, he was the defendant's servant at the time of
the accident, as the defendant had lent his car to his nephew on condition
that it be driven only by the chauffeur . Although the civilian and common
law judges disagree in this case, the reasons for judgment do not suggest
that the differences between them were related to differences in cultural
values or professional background. That such factors were not instrumental
in the decision is suggested further by the fact that the common law judges
upheld the Quebec Court of Appeal.
"s
Marwell Equipment Ltd. v. Vancouver Tug Boat Co., supra, text at
footnote 136.
ls° Hobbs Mfg. Co .
v. Shields, supra, text at footnote 134.
1°° Gartland Steamship Co . v. The Queen, supra, footnote 138 .
"Campbell v . Royal Bank of Canada, supra, footnote 114, and Kauffrnan v. Toronto Transit Commission, supra, footnote 130 .
1°2
Gilchrist v . A . & R . Farms Ltd ., supra, footnote 115 .
153 North Vancouver
v. McKenzie Barge & Marine Ways Ltd., supra,
footnote 119 .
154 Marwell Equipment Ltd. v
. Vancouver Boat Co . Ltd., supra, text at
footnote 136.
155 Hobbs Mfg . Co . v. Shields, supra, text at footnote
134 .
"Campbell v . Royal Bank of Canada, supra, footnote 114 .
15' Gilchrist v. A . & R . Farms Ltd., supra,
footnote 115 .
1°s
Radelyffe v. Rennie and McBeath, supra, text at footnote 121 .
North Vancouver v. McKenzie Barge & Marine Ways Ltd., supra,
footnote 119 .
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with those of Mr. Justice Ritchie . He voted negatively in the seven
motor vehicle appeals in which he participated, and divided his
votes evenly (three affirmative and three negative) in the other
appeals . He cast affirmative votes in an occupier's liability appeal
(58-441),"' the summer camp's liability appeal (62-519)"" and
in the farm animals appeal (59-513) ;"' he cast negative votes in
the medical malpractice appeal (65-703),"' the "gardien juridique"
appeal (59-785 ) "3 and the municipal drainage ditch appeal (65377) ."'
His break zone on the N scale is established by his negative
votes in 65-145 and 65-457,'" motor vehicle appeals in which he
concurred with Judson J., upholding the appellate court's reduction
of the quantum of damages awarded at trial. These votes may place
Abbott J. further to the right on the N scale than is warranted by
his votes on substantive questions of liability in negligence cases .
That such error is likely minimal is suggested by his five negative
votes in the other motor vehicle appeals and by his position on
the second subscale . However, some caution about Mr. Justice
Abbott's voting pattern in negligence cases is justified until a scale
covering his full term on the court is prepared and analysed.
Mr. Justice Fauteux's voting patterns on the subscales differ
from those of Martland, Ritchie and Abbott JJ ., which, as indicated above, differ from each other. Mr . Justice Fauteux voted
negatively in the four motor vehicle appeals which he heard, and
affirmatively in the five non-motor vehicle appeals : two occupier's
liability appeals (58-441 and 63-180),'"' the farm animals appeal
(59-513),"' the summer camp appeal (62-519)"" and the "garthen juridique" appeal (59-785) in which he voted inconsistently ."'
""

Cariss v. Buxton, supra, footnote 130.
"° "Gricco v. L'Externot Classique, supra, footnote 107A .
"' Fleming v. Atkinson, supra, text at footnote 135.
"'RadclYff e v. Rennie, supra, text at footnote 121 .
M. & W. Cloaks Ltd. v. Cooperberg and Davis, infra, footnote 178,
North l'ancouver v. McKenzie Barge and T-larine Ways Ltd., supra,
footnote 119.
''° Rownleu v. Osborne and Corrie v. Gilbert, supra, text at footnote
144.
''° Cariss v. Buxton, supra, footnote 130; McCormack v. T. Eaton Co
Ltd., supra, footnotes 100 and 150.
"" Fleming v. Atkinson, supra, text at footnote 135.
""Grieco v. L'Externat Classique, supra, footnote 107A .
''` A? . & W. Cloaks Ltd. v. Cooperberg and Davis, supra, footnote 173 .
Fauteux J. joined Taschereau J., as he then was, in dissent. The plaintiff
claimed damages for injuries caused to his goods by a defective steam
generating system located in the defendant's building in which the plaintiff rented business quarters . The minority held that the defendant could
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As a result he ranks tenth on the MV subscale and second on the
second subscale .
Thus, the subscales indicate that Ritchie, Abbott and Fauteux
JJ. each votes differently in motor vehicle appeals than he does in
non-motor vehicle appeals. Although the number of appeals of
each type is small, the differences in voting behaviour suggest that
the two types of appeals contain different elements to which a
justice may react in different ways.""
C) The Criminal Law Scale
The Criminal Law Scale (C) I'° contains twenty-nine divided decisions in appeals arising under the Criminal Code and
other legislation creating criminal offences, heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada after January 15th, 1958, and reported in the
not escape liability as "gardien juridique" under article 1054 of the Quebec
Civil Code as it was not established that the defendant was unable, by
reasonable means, to prevent the damage. The majority (Chief Justice
Kerwin, and Abbott and Judson JJ.) held that the defendant could not
have prevented the damage by reasonable means and therefore was not
liable .
This decision presents an interesting comparison with the decision in
Gagnon v. Deroy (58-708), supra, footnote 157, in which Taschereau J.,
as he then was, voted inconsistently joining Fauteux J. In the present case,
Abbott J., the third civilian on the court, participated and voted with the
majority to uphold the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal.
178A
The R and S coefficients on the N scale indicate, on the basis of
Guttman theory, that the cases on the scale are not unidimensional. See,
supra, text at footnote 109.
' In the construction of the C scale, I treat cases with a voting division
' of 3-2, 4-3 and 5-4 as members of the same voting division group for the
purpose of re-arranging cases to reduce to a minimum the number of
inconsistent votes . After arranging the cases with those voting divisions for
that purpose, I arrange them on the scale in groups according to their
actual voting division . I deal with cases having a voting division of 4-5, 3-4
and 2-3 in the same way.
I have omitted from the C scale the following: (a) Three appeals in
which the court upheld the validity of provincial prohibitory legislation :
Smith v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 776. The Securities Act, R.S.O., 1950,
c. 351, s. 63, held not in conflict with s. 343 of the Criminal Code (prohibition against the inclusion of false information in a prospectus) . O'Grady
v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804 . The Manitoba Highway Traffic Act, R.S.M.,
1954, c. 112, s. 55(l) held not in conflict with s. 221(1) of the Criminal
Code (criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle) . Stephens
v. The Queen, [1960] S .C.R. 823 . The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.M., 1954,
c. 112, s. 147(l) (failure to remain at or return to the scene of an accident
and render asssistance) held not in conflict with s. 221(2) of the Criminal
Code (failure to stop and render assistance, with intent to escape civil or
criminal liability) . (b) Three appeals in which the court considered charges
brought under the Lord's Day Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 171, s. 4, which makes
it an offence for any person to carry on or transact any business of his
ordinary calling on Sunday (with certain exceptions) . The majority allowed
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1958 to 1966 volumes of the Supreme Court Reports . The C scale
includes nine appeals arising from charges of homicide,"' four
appeals arising from charges of keeping a common gaming or
betting house," three appeals in connection with theft and robbery,"' three appeals arising from charges of fraud and forgery,"
two appeals in connection with sentences of preventive detention
following a finding of habitual criminality," two appeals in connection with summary conviction offences," one appeal in connection with a charge of interfering with the administration of
justice," two appeals arising under the Opium and Narcotic Drug
Act"' and one appeal arising under each of the Food and Drugs
the appeal of the accused, The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, in
C.B.C . v . A .-G . for Ontario, [1959] S.C .R . 188 . The majority dismissed
the appeal of an operator of an automatic laundry in Gordon v . The
Queen, [1961] S.C.R . 592 . Notwithstandin g the provisions of the Canadian
Bill o¬ Rights, 1960, S .C., c . 44, the court dismissed the appeal of a bowling
alley operator in Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, [1963] S.C .R.
651 . (c) One obscenity appeal : Brodie, Dansky and Rubin v . The Queen,
[1962] S.C .R. 681 (the book "Lady Chatterley's Lover" held not to be an
obscene publication) .
... Rustad v. The Queen, [1965] S .C .R . 555 (charge of non-capital murder, Criminal Code, s. 201 ; conviction of manslaughter, Criminal Code,
ss . 203, 569), More v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 522 (capital murder,
Criminal Code, s. 202A) ; Colpitts v. The Queen, [1965] S.C .R. 739
(capital murder) ; The Queen v. Warner, [1961] S.C .R . 144 (murder) ;
Workman and Huckulak v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R . 266 (capital murder) ;
La Reine v. Coté, [1964] S.C .R. 358 (capital murder) ; The Queen v,
Taylor, [1963] S.C.R . 491 (negligence causing death, Criminal Code, s.
192) ; and Salanzon v. The Queen, [1959] S.C.R . 404 and Brown v. The
Queen, [1962] S.C .R . 371 (murder) .
See Criminal Code, S.C ., 1953-54, c. 51, ss . 168, 170, 176 . The
Queen v. Topechka, [1960] S.C .R. 898 (common gaming house-slot
machine) ; The Queen v. Kerinz, [1963] S.C .R. 124 (common gaming house
-bingo games) ; Silvestro v . The Queen, -'[1965] S.C .R . 155 (common
betting house) ; The Queen v. Toupin, [1965] S.C .R . 275 (common gaming
house-slot machine) .
"=The Queen v . Cumming; [1962] S .C .R . 507 (theft from the mail,
Criminal Code, s. 298) ; The Queen v . Laroche, [1964] S.C.R . 667 (theft by
conversion, Criminal Code, s . 269(l)) ; The Queen v. George, [1960] S.C .R .
871 (robbery with violence, Criminal Code, s. 288) .
"The Queen v. Lenzlre, [1965] S .C.R . 174 (fraud, Criminal Code, s.
323(l)) ; Cowan v. The Queen, [1962] S.C .R . 476 (forgery, Criminal Code,
s. 309(l)) ; Koury v. The Queen, [1964] S.C .R . 212 (fraud and conspiracy
to commit fraud, Criminal Code, ss . 323(l), 408) .
.. . Criminal Code, s. 660 . The Queen v . MacDonald, [1965] S .C .R. 831 ;
Gordon v . The Queen, [1965] S.C.R . 312 .
Esc
Paul v . The Queen, [1960] S .C .R . 452 (impaired driving, Criminal
Code, s. 223) ; Dennis v . The Queen, [1958] S.C .R. 473 (impaired driving) .
x'~3
Wright, McDermott and Feelev . The Queen, [1963] S.C.R . 539
(Criminal Code, ss . 101(b) and 408-- the case also involved a charge, not
considered on appeal, of keeping a common gaming house, Criminal Code,
s . 176(1)) .

R .S .C ., 1952, c. 201, as re-enacted by S.C., 1953-54, c. 38 . Goldhar v.
The"7Queen, [1960] S.C .R. 60, McDonald v . The Queen, [1960] S .C .R . 186 .
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Act," the Saskatchewan Coroner's Act," and the Migratory Birds
Convention Act."'
The C scale is constructed to rmake possible an examination
of the erect of the justices' votes on prosecutions brought by the
Crown under the Criminal Code and other statutes creating
criminal offences . A vote favouring the acquittal of an accused, or
acquittal on the more serious of two charges, or the granting of a
new trial or of leave to appeal when requested by the accused, is
classified as affirmative ; a vote favouring conviction, or conviction
on the more serious of two charges, or the granting of a new trial
or of leave to appeal when requested by the Crown, is classified
as negative . Thus, an affirmative vote has the effect of shielding
an accused from prosecution or assuring him of fairer or, at least,
more favourable treatment in a second trial, or benefiting him . in
some other way. A negative vote has the effect of promoting the
Crown's ability to prosecute and obtain a conviction, and of assuring that the Crown receives fairer or more favourable treatment
in the lower courts.
The C scale has an R of .93 and an S of .68. The difference
between the observed consistency and the minimum consistency
possible (computed for justices)," given the structure of the scale
is .15. Accordingly, the scale exhibits the degree of consistency
conventionally accepted as establishing the unidimensionality -of
items on a Guttman cumulative scale l`
In spite of the incidence of non-participationlB' resulting from
the court's practice of sitting in panels, the C scale indicates five
fairly clear and distinct types of voting behaviour.
1 . The voting pattern described for Mr . Justice Cartwright
may be classified as very pro-accused, on the basis both of the high
"S.C ., 1952-53, c. 38, s. 25(b). Kipp v. Att-Gen. for Ontario, [1965]
S.C .R. 57 .
"'Coroner's Act, R.S .C ., 1953, c. 106, ss . 8, 8a, 15, 20, as am . by S.S .,
1960, c. 14. Batary v. A .-G. for Saskatchewan, [1965] S.C.R . 465.
S. 5, which rendered a person charged with murder compellable to give
evidence at the inquest on the body of his alleged victim, was held to be
ultra vires the provincial legislature, as legislation in relation to criminal
law and procedure in criminal matters.
R.S .C., 1952, c. 179. The Queen v. George, [1966] S.C .R. 267.
'sl
The MMR for justices is .78, the MMR for cases is .69.
ion
But, see, supra, text at footnote 50 .
... The scale contains 180 votes. If nine justices participated in each of
the twenty-nine cases, it would contain 261 votes. Accordingly, eighty-one
non-participations result from the courts practice of sitting in panels. An
additional eighty-seven non-responses result from the inclusion on the
scale of a column for each of the twelve justices who were on the court
at any time during the eight years under review.

Voting division
Scale score
Batary
Rustad
More
MacDonald
Topechka
Brown
Warner
Kerim
Colpitts
Paul
Dennis
Crwan
Lemire
Cumming
Wright, McDermott
Kipp
Silvestro
Workman & Huculak
Coté
Laroche
Koury
Goldhar
George
Taylor
Toupin
Gordon
Salamon
McDonald
George
29 appeals

1 .00
1 .00
65-465
65-555
63-522
65-831
60-898
62-371
61-144
63-124
65-739
60-452
58-473
62-476
65-174
62-507
63-539
65-57
65-155
63-266
64-358
64-667
64-212
60-60
60-871
63-491
65-275
65-312
59-404
60-186
66-267

C
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

.82
.55
H

+

+
+
+

+
+
+

25

R = .93
S - .68
R-MMR (computed for justices) - .15

-

K

+
(-)
+

+

+ 25
- 0

S
+
+

+
+
+

+
+
+
-}+
+

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

CRIMINAL SCALE (C)
.80
.67
.55
.35
.38
.38 - .17 - .21

+
+
-+-

-J
-

9
2

11

R
+
+
+
+
+
+
-+

+

+
( +)
( +)

+
+

-

-

-

8
2

2
1

12
10

M
+

(-)
+
+
(-)
+
+
+
-

6
11

.18
.40
.15
-.48 - .59 - .72
A

(-)
+
+
+
-

L

+
-

3
14

-

-

+
+
-

-

-

J
+

( +)
2
3

3
17

10
3
22
17
17
5
20
+ = pro-accused
- -_ pro-Crown
( ) inconsistent votes are shown in brackets

.19 0 .00
- .90 -1 .00
T
+
( +)
( +)
-

( +)
( +)
-

F

--

- 5
21

26

0
24

Ra

6-1
4-1
5-2
5-2
3-2
3-2
5-4
3-2
4-3
3-4
2-3
2-3
3-4
2-3
2-3
2-3
2-3
2-4
3-6
3-6
3-6
1-4
1-4
1-4
1-4
1-4
1-6
1-6
1-6

24
180 participations

a,

y

a
%~
r~n
a
n
Y

d

z

Ô
k
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scale score of 1.00 and of his voting division of twenty-five affirmative votes in twenty-five participations (1 .00 affirmative) .
2. The voting patterns of Mr . Justice Hall and Mr. Justice
Spence are identified as pro-accused by the scale scores of .55 and
.38 respectively, and as very pro-accused by the voting division of
nine affirmative and two negative votes for Hall J. ( .82 affirmative), and eight affirmative and two negative votes for Spence J.
(.80 affirmative) . Adopting the measure which gives the less
extreme result, the voting patterns should be classified as proaccused.
3 . Mr . Justice Ritchie's voting pattern may be classified as
neutral according to the voting division of twelve affirmative votes
as against ten negative votes (.55 affirmative), and his scale score

of - .17.

4. Two justices, (Martland and Abbott JJ .) exhibit voting
patterns which may be classified as pro-Crown.
(a)Mr. Justice Martland's voting pattern characterized by a scale
score of - .21 and a voting division of six affirmative votes out of
seventeen participations ( .35 affirmative) is identified as proCrown on the basis of both measures .
(b) Mr . Justice Abbott's voting pattern is identified as pro-Crown
on the basis of his scale score of - .48, and highly pro-Crown on
the basis of his voting division of fourteen negative votes in seventeen participations (.18 affirmative) .
Although the voting patterns of both of these justices are classified as pro-Crown, Mr . Justice Martland's voting pattern is more
moderately so than is that of Mr . Justice Abbott .
5 . The scale describes highly pro-Crown voting patterns for
three justices-Judson J., Taschereau C.J . and Fauteux J. The
classification is suggested both by their high scale score ( - .72,
- .90 and -1 .00) and by their voting divisions. Judson J. cast
seventeen pro-Crown votes in twenty participations (.15 affirmative) ; Taschereau C.J . cast, twenty-one pro-Crown votes in twentysix participations ( .19 affirmative) and Fauteux J. upheld the
Crown in the twenty-four appeals in which he participated (.0
affirmative) .
Mr . Justice Rand did not participate in any of the appeals
which appear on the C scale. Chief Justice Kerwin and Mr . Justice
Locke participated in three and five appeals respectively. For the
reasons expressed in connection with the T scale and the hT scale,
we are, unable to draw any conclusions about the voting patterns
of these justices from the C scale.
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In deciding the twenty-nine appeals on the C scale, the justices
were called upon to consider five general types of legal problems :
the adequacy of the charge of the trial judge, questions of statutory
construction, whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal,
the special pleas of res judicata, autrefois acquit and inconsistent
verdict, and defects in the procedure followed by one of the
parties . It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the legal
considerations which govern each of these matters . I propose,
however, to indicate briefly the diversity of the issues considered
by the court in these appeals, and to point out that notwithstanding that diversity, Cartwright, Hall and Spence JJ. voted
affirmatively in over eighty per cent of the cases in which they
participated, and Tasebereau C.J., and Abbott, Judson and Fauteux JJ. voted negatively in over eighty per cent of the cases in
which they participated .
In eleven appeals, the court considered'the adequacy of the
directions given by the trial judge to the jury or to himself as the
trier of fact. These appeals included seven cases of homicide"' and
one each of forgery,"' keeping a common betting house,"' theft by
conversion '9' and robbery with violence ."' Mr. Justices Cartwright,
's' Rustad v. The Queen (65-555) (whether the trial judge dealt adequately with, inter alia, the effect to be given to evidence that the accused
was intoxicated, when assessing the validity of a confession) ; More v. The
Queen (63-522) (the effect to be given to medical evidence called by the
defence to show that the state of mind of the accused was such that he was
incapable of a "planned and deliberate" murder, that is, capital murder) ;
Colpitts v. The Queen (65-739) (whether the trial judge failed to comment
adequately on the evidence given by the accused that his confession was
false and was given to protect a friend ; and the effect of s. 592 (1) (b) (iii)
of the Criminal Code) ; Workman and Huculak v. The Queen (63-266)
(failure in the circumstances to charge the jury that it was open to them
to find that one of two accused was an accessory only) ; La Reine v. Coté
(64-358) (whether the charge left the jury with the impression that it
could convict the accused of capital murder even if the bodily harm which
caused the death was inflicted by a third party with whom the accused
was engaged in committing a theft, without any assistance from the accused); Salamon v. The Queen (59-404) (whether the trial judge should
have directed the jury on the question of provocation, and the effect of
drunkenness on provocation) ; Brown v. The Queen (62-371) (the degree
of negligence required to convict of manslaughter), cited, supra, footnote
180.
"'Crwan v. The Queen (62-476) supra, footnote 183 (a direction that
the jury was entitled to rely on the truth of a letter which was improperly
admitted in evidence; further, whether the record contained any evidence
to establish the defence relied on) .
"Silrestro v. The Queen (65-155), supra, footnote 181 (a direction
that a conviction should not be entered unless the Crown proves not only
that the accused kept a house for the purpose of receiving bets but also
the manner in which such bets were received) .
ls' The Queen v. Laroche (64-667), supra, footnote 182 (the brevity of
certain parts of the charge to the jury).
'"The Queen v. George (60-871), ibid. (the duty of the trial judge
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Hall and Spence, the three justices located on the left side of the
scale, voted affirmatively in all of these appeals in which they
participated (nine, six and five participations respectively) ."' Mr.
Justice Ritchie, whose voting pattern was identified on the C scale
as neutral, voted affirmatively five times and negatively four
times ."' 1!4artland J., who ranks immediately to the right of Ritchie
in
J. on the C scale, voted negatively in five such appeals"" located.201A
in
affirmatively
one.
the bottom half of the C scale and voted
Mr. Justices Abbott and Judson voted negatively in six of their
seven participations 2°3 Taschereau C.J. and Fauteux J., located on
the right side of the C scale and having highly pro-Crown voting
patterns, voted negatively in the nine appeals in which they participated ."
In the seven appeals raising a question of statutory interpre..
tation,"' Cartwright J. voted affirmatively in the five cases. in
to consider an included offence not raised by the Crown; the effect of intoxication
on the ability to form the intent to commit common assault) .
"s Cartwright J . participated in Rustad, More, Brown, Colpitts, Cowan,
Silvestro, Cotg, Laroche and Salamon ; Hall J. participated in Rustad, More,
Colpitts, Workman and Huculak, Cotg, Laroche ; Spence J. participated in
Rustad, Colpitts, Silvestro, Cotg, Laroche, supra, footnotes 194 to 198.
Affirmatively in Rustad, More, Colpitts, Cowan, Workman and
Huculak; negatively in Silvestro, Cotg, Laroche, George, supra, footnotes
192 to 198.
"Workman and Huculak, Cotg, Laroche, George, Salamon, supra,

footnotes
194 to 198.
201A Brown, supra, footnote 194.
"Both voted affirmatively in More and negatively in Colpitts, Workman and Huculak, Cotg, Laroche, and Salamon. Abbott J, voted negatively
in Rustad; Judson J. voted negatively in Cowan, supra, footnotes 194 to
198...
.
Both voted negatively in More, Brown, Cowan, Silvestro, Cotg,
Laroche, George and Salanton . Taschereau C.J. also voted negatively in
Colpitts ; Fauteux J. also voted negatively in Workman and Huculak, supra,
footnotes 194 to 198.
"The Queen v . Topechka (60-898), and The Queen v . Toupin (65275), supra, footnote 181 (s. 170(2) (b) (i) of the Criminal Code defining
"slot machine") ; The Queen v . Kerim (63-124), supra, footnote 181 (an
owner who permits his premises to be used for the playing of games, but
does not participate in the operation of the games, is not guilty of "keeping"
a common gaming house under s. 176(1) of the Criminal Code) ; Colpitts
v. The Queen (65-739), supra, footnote 181 (if there was an error in law
at the trial, an appellate court may not dismiss the appeal on the ground
that "no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred" within
the meaning of s. 592(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, unless the Crown
satisfies the court that the verdict of guilty would necessarily have been
the same if the error had not occurred) . The court considered, too, the
validity of the trial judge's charge, see, supra, footnote 194; The Queen
v. Cumming (62-507), supra, footnote 182 (the theft of money from envelopes prepared by a post office investigator and mingled with the mail
for the sole purpose of testing the honesty of the accused post office employee was held to be the theft of something "sent by post, after it is
deposited at a post office and before it is delivered" within the meaning
of s. 298 (1) (a) (i) of the Criminal Code) ; The Queen v. George (66-267),
205 See next page.
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which he participated, and Spence J. in his single participation ."
Abbott, Judson and Fauteux JJ. voted negatively in all appeals in
this category in which they participated (three, four and five appeals, respectively) ." Hall J. voted negatively in two of the three
such appeals which he heard, casting his only negative votes on
the C scale.`"` Ritchie J. voted affirmatively in three participations
out of five,`"' and Martland J. in three of four." Tasebereau C.J.
voted affirmatively in two of the six appeals he heard. The two
affirmative votes constitute two of his four inconsistent votes on
the scale."
There are eight appeals on the C scale in which the primary
question was whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
In five appeals, the court considered whether an appeal was based
on a question of law, so as to be within the jurisdiction conferred
by sections 597 and 598 of the Criminal Code ;"'L in two appeals,
the court considered its jurisdiction to hear an appeal against
sentence ; in one appeal, the court considered its jurisdiction
under section 41 of the Supreme Court Act."
2l 1

supra, footnote 190 (The Indian Act, R.S .C., 1952, c. 149, s. 87 does not
render inapplicable to Indians the Migratory Birds Convention Act, supra,
footnote 190, notwithstanding that the latter Act is inconsistent with Indian
treaties) ; Dennis v. The Queen (58-473), supra, footnote 185 (the meaning
of "respondent" in s. 722(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code) .
Kerim, Colpitts, Cunnning, Toupin, George, supra, footnote 204.
Colpills, ibid .
"T Abbott J. : Colpitts, Toupin, George ; Judson J. : Topechka, Colpitts,
Cumming, George ; Fauteux J. : Topechka, Dennis, Cramming, Toupie,
George, ibid.
"r
Toupin and George ; he voted affirmatively in Colpitts, ibid .
"" Affirmative in Topechka, Kerim, Colpitts ; negative in Cumming,
George, ibid.
"'Affirmative in Topechka, Kerirn, Dennis; negative in George, ibid .
=" Affirmative in Topechka, Cumming; negative in Kerinr, Colpins, Dennis, Toupin, ibid.
'"The Queen v. Warner (61-144), supra, footnote 180 (the majority
held that if the appellate court gives two reasons for its decision, one
raising a question of law and the other raising a question of fact or mixed
fact and law, an appeal does not lie to the Supreme Court) ; The Queen v.
Lenrire (65-174), supra, footnote 183, and The Queen v. Taylor (63-491),
supra, footnote 180 (whether the appeal was based on a question of law:
whether The Queen v. Warner, supra, applied) ; Brown v. The Queen, and
The Queen v. Toupin (65-275) (whether the dissent below was based on
a question of law) .
=1
" Goldhar v. The Queen (60-60), supra, footnote 187 (Criminal Code
s. 597 held not to confer jurisdiction to hear an appeal against sentence
based on a question of law) ; The Queen v. MacDonald (65-831), supra,
footnote 184 (the court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a
judgment setting aside a sentence of preventive detention) .
Paul v. The Queen (60-452), supra, footnote 185 (the court has no
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the order of a County Court judge
dismissing an appeal from a magistrate for want of jurisdiction : or an
appeal from the order of a Court of Appeal refusing leave to appeal from
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Cartwright J. voted affirmatively in all eight jurisdictional
appeals . In the five jurisdictional appeals brought by the Crown,
he held that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear the
appeal ;"' 'and in the three jurisdictional appeals brought by the
accused he held that the court had jurisdiction." Mr. Justice
Fauteux voted negatively in all appeals involving jurisdiction-in
which he participated, holding that the court had jurisdiction to
hear four appeals brought by the Crown' and no jurisdiction to
hear three appeals brought by the accused ."' Mr. Justice Martland
held that the court had jurisdiction to hear the five appeals in
this group in which he participated, three being appeals by the
Crown,"' and two, appeals by the accused ."'
In the three appeals considering the special pleas of res judicata, autrefois acquit and inconsistent verdicts," Cartwright and
Hall JJ. voted affirmatively in, the cases in which they partici
pated ." All other justices voted negatively in all cases in which
they participated, other than Ritchie J., who voted affirmatively in
one of the two appeals which he heard.'
In the four appeals considering allegations of procedural defects, 22} Cartwright J. voted affirmatively in the three appeals in
which he participated,"' as did Martland J. in the two appeals in
such order of the County Court) . The Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1952,
c. 259, s. 41.
MacDonald, Warner, Lemire, Taylor, Toupin, supra, footnotes 212 to
214 .
srs Brown,
Goldhar, Paul, supra, footnotes 213, 214 .
Warner, Lemire, Taylor, Toupin, supra, footnotes 212, 213 .
Brown, Goldhar, Paul, supra, footnotes 213, 214 .
"MacDonald, Warner and Lemire, supra, footnotes 212, 213 . Mr.
Justice Martland's two inconsistent negative votes were cast in MacDonald
and Warner.
Brown, Paul, supra, footnote 214 .
Wright, McDermott and Feeley v. The Queen (63-539), supra, footnote 186 (autrefois acquit and res judicata) ; Koury v . The Queen (64-212),
supra, footnote 183 (inconsistent verdicts) ; MacDonald v . The Queen
(60-186), supra, footnote 187 (res judicata) .
Cartwright J. participated in the three appeals ; Hall J., in Wright
and Koury, supra, footnote 221 .
Affirmatively in Koury; negatively in MacDonald, ibid.
2 "Kipp v . A .-G . Ontario (65-57), supra, footnote 188 (whether indictment charging the sale of "dead animals" defined as either animals not
properly killed or diseased animals under The Food and Drugs Act, S.C.,
1952-53, c. 38, s. 25(b) is void for duplicity) ; Gordon v. The Queen
(65-312), supra, footnote 184 (whether notice of application for a sentence
of preventive detention "in addition to" rather than "in lieu of" the sentence imposed for a substantive offence is valid) ; Paul v . The Queen
(60-452), supra, footnote 185 (whether notice of appeal against conviction
of a summary conviction offence raises adequate grounds) ; Dennis v. The
Queen (58-473), supra, footnote 185 (whether notice of appeal against
conviction of a summary conviction offence was properly served) .
Paul, Kipp and Gordon, supra, footnote 224 .
n5
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which he participated .' Taschereau C.J., and Fauteux and Judson
JJ. voted negatively in all the appeals of this sort in which they
participated .`'
Ritchie J., with a voting division of twelve affirmative and ten
negative votes, is the only justice whose voting pattern is neutral
as between the Crown and the accused. He voted affirmatively in
five of the six homicide appeals in which he participated,"' and
negatively in the three appeals in connection with theft and robbery;_' he voted affirmatively in two of the three betting house
appeals'"' and in two of the three fraud and forgery appeals in
which he participated.- " In the jurisdictional appeals in which he
participated, he held that the court had jurisdiction to hear one
of the two appeals brought by the accused''' and one of the three
appeals brought by the Crown."'
Conclusion

As I indicated above, my purpose in this article is to present a
report of an initial effort to apply a behavioural method to the
work of the Supreme Court of Canada . I have used only one
such method, scalogram analysis, and I have applied it to a relatively small number of decisions. Bearing in mind these limitations
in scope, I shall not attempt to anticipate the broad conclusions
about the nature of decision-making by the court, which may be
warranted after further work has been done . I wish to conclude this
report by drawing together some of the findings that emerge from
the separate examinations of taxation, negligence and criminal
law decisions.
The scalogram of each group of cases indicates that some
justices consistently uphold or oppose the claims of the taxpayer
in taxation appeals, the plaintiffs in negligence appeals, or the
~-~ Paul and Dennis, ibid.
`"Taschereau C.J . the four cases : Judson J. Paul, Kipp and Gordon ;
Fauteux J .Paul, Dennis, Gordon, ibid.
. Rustad (65-555) ; More (63-522) ; Warner (61-144) ; Colpitts (652
739) ; Workman and Huculak (63-266) ; he voted negatively in Coté (64358), supra, footnote 180.
2=9 Cumming (62-507) ; Laroche (64-667) ; George (60-871), supra, footnote 182.
"'Affirmatively in Topechka (60-898) ; Kerirn (63-124) ; and negatively
in Silvestro (65-155), supra, footnote 181.
Affirmatively in Cowan (62-476) ; Koury (64-212) ; and negatively in
Lemire (65-174), supra, footnote 183 .
Paul (jurisdiction) (60-452) ; Goldhar (no jurisdiction) (60-60),
supra, footnotes 213, 214.
'Leinire (jurisdiction) (65-174) ; MacDonald (65-831), and Warner
(no jurisdiction) (61-144), supra, footnotes 212, 213 .
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accused in criminal appeals. As the appeals on each scale raise
a wide variety of legal issues, it is- reasonable to hypothesize that
such justices (who appear near the left or right sides of the scales
and have voting patterns classified as "highly pro" or "pro") base
their decisions, at least in part, on the value or policy issue raised
by the appeals on each scale." An examination of the three scalograms, taken together, indicates that some justices tend to have
one-sided voting patterns on more than one scale. This suggests
the hypothesis that these justices pursue policy goals in more
than one area of the law.
The voting patterns described on each scalogram for each
justice may be conveniently represented by indicating the position
of each justice on a profile line, divided into five segments to
represent the five categories of highly pro-affirmative, proaffirmative, neutral, pro-negative and highly pro-negative . The
rankings of the justices on the profile lines differ somewhat from
those on the scales, as they are based not on scale score alone,
but on voting patterns classified according to both scale score
and voting division."

Highly
proProaffirmative affirmative
Taxation
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Highly
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The two justices who appear most frequently near the extremes
oî the profile lines are Mr. Justice Cartwright and Mr . Justice
Abbott. Mr . Justice Cartwright appears near the left side of each
of the three lines. His voting pattern is in favour of the taxpayer
in taxation appeals and of the plaintiff in negligence appeals, and
highly in favour of the accused in criminal appeals. Accordingly,
he supports the individual or business organization in disputes
with government (criminal law and taxation cases), and the in-

"See
supra, footnote 18.
" Kerwin
C.J. and Rand and Locke JJ. have been omitted.
The order in which the judges appear on the scales has been retained
on the profile lines, except where a justice's voting pattern is characterized
differently by his scale score and voting division.
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dividual in disputes with business organizations (the negligence
appeals, in which, in effect, plaintiffs assert claims against insurers ) . The effect of the voting patterns in negligence and taxation
cases is to promote the wide distribution of the cost of normal
risks through non-government techniques such as insurance, but to
inhibit the satisfaction of government revenue demands necessary
for the expansion of government services .
Mr. Justice Abbott's positions on the profile lines contrast with
those of Mr. Justice Cartwright, as he appears near the right side
of the three lines . His voting pattern is in favour of the government
in taxation appeals, of the defendant in negligence appeals and of
the Crown in criminal law appeals . His voting pattern which is
never in the "highly pro" category, does not place him at the
extreme right side of the taxation or criminal law profile lines, but
does place him at the extreme right side of the negligence line. The
effect of his votes in negligence and taxation appeals appears to be
to promote the satisfaction of government revenue demands, making
possible the expansion of government services, but to inhibit the
wide distribution of the costs of normal risks by way of private
insurance . With respect to his support o£ government in taxation
and criminal law appeals, it should be remembered that he was
a member of the federal cabinet for many years .
Mr. Justices Hall and Spence resemble Mr. Justice Cartwright
in their support of plaintiffs' claims for compensation in negligence
cases and their support of the accused in criminal cases . However,
the voting patterns of both are neutral as between taxpayer and
government.
The voting patterns described for Mr. Justices Judson and
Fauteux have similar characteristics. Both support the government
in taxation and in criminal law appeals, and in these respects their
voting patterns resemble that of Mr. Justice Abbott . Mr. Justice
Judson, whose voting pattern is highly in favour of the Crown
in both taxation and criminal law appeals, is the only justice whose
voting pattern is classified as "highly pro" on two scales . Both
Judson and Fauteux JJ . are neutral as between plaintiffs and defendants in negligence appeals . However, both have anomalous voting
patterns in those appeals . Mr. Justice Fauteux's voting pattern on
the N scale is classified as pro-defendant on the basis of his scale
score . Mr. Justice Judson's voting pattern suggests a pro-plaintiff
tendency in negligence appeals .
Chief Justice Taschereau shows mild support for plaintiffs'
claims for compensation in negligence appeals . Although he
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appears as a neutral in taxation appeals, his voting division shows
a tendency to support the taxpayer as against the government . The
effect of the voting pattern appears t6 be to favour compensation
for injuries in negligence cases through private means, and not
to support government claims for revenue, necessary for expansion
of government services . In criminal law appeals he is highly in
favour of the Crown.
Taschereau C.J. and Fauteux J., the two French-Canadian
justices on the court, exhibit quite different, voting patterns in
taxation and negligence appeals, Chief Justice Taschereau favour
ing the taxpayer and the plaintiff to a considerably greater extent
than Mr . Justice Fauteux. In criminal law appeals, their voting
patterns are similar.
Mr . Justices Ritchie and Martland are the most neutral justices
on the three scales . Mr . Justice Ritchie's voting pattern is neutral
in taxation, negligence and criminal law appeals. Mr. Justice
Martland's voting pattern is neutral in taxation and negligence
appeals and pro-Crown in criminal law appeals.

